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Article 
Prospective Grandfathering: Anticipating 
the Energy Transition Problem 
Christopher Serkin† & Michael P. Vandenbergh†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Legal change poses familiar but difficult problems for the 
legal system.1 New regulatory regimes can disrupt settled expec-
tations and property rights.2 The Takings Clause seeks to tem-
per the most extreme costs of such legal change, and in the pro-
cess can constrain governments’ ability and willingness to adopt 
new laws and regulations.3 Even unsuccessful takings claims—
or the threat of takings claims—can exert significant political 
pressure, to the extent they implicate commitments to fairness 
and freedom from government intrusion and reflect legitimate-
seeming grievances by property owners.4 
 
†  Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity Law School.  
††  David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Climate 
Change Research Network, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land 
Use Program, Vanderbilt University Law School. Thanks to Daniel Raimi for 
insights on energy data, and to Jim Rossi and Greg Stein for comments on an 
earlier draft. Thanks also to participants at faculty workshops at Vanderbilt 
Law School and the University of Maryland School of Law, at the 2017 Property 
Conference at Texas A&M, at the Progressive Property Conference at Loyola 
New Orleans, and at the Private Law Workshop at the University of Tel Aviv 
hosted by Hanoch Dagan and Roy Kreitner. Thanks especially to Rob Abrams, 
Emily Burns, Turner Henderson, Emmett McKinney, and Kacy Murphree for 
excellent research assistance. Copyright © 2018 by Christopher Serkin & Mi-
chael P. Vandenbergh. 
 1. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 509, 517 (1986); see also infra note 191 (citing and discussing “legal 
transitions” literature). 
 2. Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Co-
nundrum, 91 TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2015 (2013). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II. 
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The interaction between property rights and legal transi-
tions is frequently fraught and fiercely contested. In the typical 
situation, property owners object to newly imposed burdens fol-
lowing some change in the law.5 But what if the need for legal 
change can be anticipated far in advance—years, or even dec-
ades before new rules and regulations are adopted? Are there 
tools available to the government ex ante that will preserve reg-
ulatory flexibility in the future by forestalling regulatory takings 
claims and blunt the fairness concerns that fuel takings argu-
ments in public debates? This Article identifies just such tools 
and argues for their adoption specifically in the context of natu-
ral gas regulation. Natural gas presents an urgent and fascinat-
ing example precisely because we can predict the need for strict 
new regulations in the future, while simultaneously embracing 
the trend towards expanding use of natural gas today. This Ar-
ticle therefore examines the problem of natural gas in detail, 
both because it is independently important and because it re-
veals the ways in which careful planning for the future can dis-
arm property rights as a basis for objecting to necessary legal 
change in other regulatory contexts. 
Power generation in the United States is undergoing pro-
found changes as new methods of producing natural gas drive 
down costs while regulatory and other pressures on coal-fired 
power plants precipitate a shift away from coal-generated power. 
Generating a kilowatt of electricity by burning natural gas re-
leases roughly half as much carbon dioxide (CO2) as generating 
a kilowatt from coal, and a complete switch of electricity gener-
ation from coal to natural gas will prevent more than 700 million 
metric tons (MMT) of CO2 emissions annually.6 In the face of this 
difference, many experts are advocating for the large-scale adop-
tion of natural gas as quickly as possible.7 
 
 5. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the coal in-
dustry’s objection to the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan). 
 6. Calculation based on data from U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR OCTOBER 2016 tbl.1.1 
(2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/archive/december2016.pdf; Fre-
quently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced per Kilowatt-
Hour when Generating Electricity with Fossil Fuels?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
[hereinafter FAQ], https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=74&t=11 (last re-
viewed June 8, 2017). 
 7. See, e.g., Jay Apt, The Other Reason To Shift Away from Coal: Air Pol-
lution That Kills Thousands Every Year, SCI. AM.: THE CONVERSATION (June 7, 
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-other-reason-to-shift 
-away-from-coal-air-pollution-that-kills-thousands-every-year (arguing that a 
shift to natural gas will, inter alia, improve public health). 
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The transition from coal is underway, and natural gas is as-
cendant. Although deregulatory efforts by the new administra-
tion may have an effect, the increased use of natural gas is ex-
pected to continue even if the federal government continues to 
back off of regulations designed to reduce coal-fired power gen-
eration over the next four to eight years.8 Deregulatory efforts 
directed at natural gas fracking will only accelerate the process 
by reducing the cost of natural gas. In addition, roughly one-
third of all states, including California and New York, can be 
expected to continue to pursue climate-mitigation regulatory in-
itiatives, which will combine with the declining cost of natural 
gas and renewables and the increasing pressure from major cor-
porate buyers of renewable energy to reduce demand for coal-
fired power regardless of the status of the so-called regulatory 
War on Coal.9 
Natural gas is still a fossil fuel, however, and despite the 
carbon savings over coal, energy generated by natural gas is still 
expected to produce 1685 MMT of CO2 in the year 2030, and 1835 
MMT of CO2 in 2040.10 Natural gas is therefore a bridge fuel.11 
It is a step along the path to a zero-carbon energy supply. But 
experts anticipate that substantially reducing the risk of cata-
strophic climate change will require meeting a target of no more 
than a two-degree-centigrade global temperature increase over 
preindustrial levels (the goal adopted in the Paris Agreement).12 
 
 8. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2017 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050, at 69 (2017), https://www.eia.gov/ 
outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf (projecting that natural gas use for electricity 
generation over the 2016 to 2040 period would have increased more with imple-
mentation of the Clean Power Plan, as assumed by the Reference Case, but in-
creased during this period even in the absence of the Clean Power Plan, as as-
sumed in the No Clean Power Plan cases). Although certainly not a 
disinterested analyst, then-President Barack Obama published a policy forum 
essay in Science in which he projected that “[b]ecause the cost of new electricity 
generation using natural gas is projected to remain low relative to coal, it is 
unlikely that utilities will change course and choose to build coal-fired power 
plants, which would be more expensive than natural gas plants, regardless of 
any near-term changes in federal policy.” Barack Obama, The Irreversible Mo-
mentum of Clean Energy, 355 SCIENCE 126, 128 (2017). 
 9. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 10. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2016 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at A-35 tbl.A18, https://www.eia 
.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2016).pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., Christopher Helman, Energy Sec Chu Says Global Warming 
Is Real; Nat Gas Will Be Bridge Fuel, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2010), https://www.forbes 
.com/sites/energysource/2010/03/09/chu-global-warming-is-real. 
 12. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, art. I, ¶ 1(a), 2015. 
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To meet this “2C climate goal,” the U.S. share of CO2 emissions 
from the electricity sector will have to decline by over ninety per-
cent by 2040 and shrink to zero by 2050.13 
We can therefore predict today that there is a high likeli-
hood that either a steep carbon tax or strict regulations limiting 
the use of natural gas will be adopted within the next thirty 
years.14 Although this is unlikely to occur in the next several 
years, nature bats last and near-term delay will only increase 
the magnitude of the emissions reductions necessary to address 
the problem over the following decades. And we can predict with 
equal certainty that owners and investors in natural-gas-fired 
electric plants and the associated infrastructure—which to-
gether we call the natural gas industry15—will object to those 
regulatory efforts. Other scholars and commenters have recog-
nized the possibility that switching to natural gas might have 
lock-in effects, making it more difficult to move to zero-carbon 
sustainable sources of energy in the future.16 They have identi-
fied the path dependency that results from building out an en-
ergy infrastructure, and the economic and political pressures 
that make it difficult to change course.17 We identify and focus 
on a different source of policy lock-in: the legal protection for 
property entitlements, and the political pressures that accom-
pany such protection. 
A central objection to strict regulation of natural gas in the 
future—whatever the precise regulatory form—is likely to be 
that it amounts to an unconstitutional taking of vested property 
rights. There are measures we can take today, though, to fore-
stall those claims thirty years from now. One is relatively easy: 
 
 13. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 10. 
 14. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 15. In this Article, the term natural gas industry includes natural gas wells 
and pipelines that supply natural-gas-fired power plants, as well as the power 
plants themselves. We exclude other parts of the natural gas business more 
broadly construed—for example, home heating companies and others who rely 
on natural gas production for transport and other purposes. 
 16. See, e.g., Symposium, Environmental and Social Implications of Hy-
draulic Fracturing and Gas Drilling in the United States: An Integrative Work-
shop for the Evaluation of the State of Science and Policy, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 245, 249 (2012) (“Some viewed natural gas as a transition fuel between 
coal and renewables, while others expressed concern that investing in infra-
structure to accommodate increased natural gas development would lock na-
tions into natural gas dependence for decades.”). 
 17. See, e.g., MIT, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS 67 (2011), https:// 
energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MITEI-The-Future-of-Natural 
-Gas.pdf (“Trade flows can be particularly sensitive to the development of trans-
portation infrastructure and political considerations . . . .”). 
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the Takings Clause protects only reasonable investment-backed 
expectations from significant adverse regulatory changes.18 By 
developing a record today about what constitute reasonable ex-
pectations for natural gas investments, we can constrain takings 
claims in the future. This can be done by public or private actors. 
Regulators decades from now will be able to point back to con-
temporaneous reports, studies, and writing demonstrating that 
investors knew or should have known that natural gas would 
have a climate-imposed lifespan of only roughly thirty years. 
Defining the extent of reasonable expectations today will 
limit how investments in natural gas will be protected in the fu-
ture. But it is no foolproof protection. We therefore also propose 
a stronger response in the form of a regulatory innovation that 
we label “prospective grandfathering.” According to current land 
use doctrine, a government can—in certain circumstances—reg-
ulate away an existing use of property so long as it allows the 
use to remain in place for some period after the new regulatory 
prohibition.19 For example, a zoning change prohibiting adult 
uses in a particular area might apply to a preexisting adult 
bookstore.20 This bookstore, now a prior nonconforming use, can 
be given a prespecified amount of time to remain open, after 
which, in many states, the government can shut it down without 
paying compensation.21 This time-limited grandfathering, called 
amortization, makes permissible what would otherwise have 
been an unconstitutional regulatory taking, so long as the use is 
allowed to stay open long enough for the owners to recover a suf-
ficient portion of their investment in the property.22 
We propose a modified version of this approach where the 
grandfathering happens ex ante, before the regulatory prohibi-
tion. By triggering an amortization period today, governments 
 
 18. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (describing 
the Takings Clause as protecting “reasonable investment backed expectations”). 
 19. For an extended discussion and critique of this protection, see Christo-
pher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1222 (2009). 
 20. See Pa. Nw. Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 A.2d 1372, 1373 
(Pa. 1991), for a case involving exactly this situation. 
 21. See generally Serkin, supra note 19, at 1236 (discussing amortization). 
 22. See Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. City of Ridgeland, 797 So. 2d 898, 903 (Miss. 
2001) (upholding “fairly established amortization periods” for pre-existing non-
conforming billboards). But see Pa. Nw. Distribs., Inc., 584 A.2d at 1376 (inval-
idating amortization as a tool to eliminate prior nonconforming uses). 
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will be free to regulate in the future because investors will al-
ready have recovered the value of their investments.23 Like the 
opposite of a sunset provision, we propose a kind of sunrise, 
where federal or state agencies announce regulations today that 
will become effective (or implemented) far in the future, and 
owners can recover the value of their investments in the in-
terim.24 This applies beyond the context of natural gas, and 
promises a new model for managing the costs of legal transitions. 
The sunrise approach we propose is particularly appealing 
for natural gas, however, because it is politically expedient. It 
imposes few if any costs today, and states that support carbon 
mitigation (roughly a third of all states with more than half of 
the U.S. population) could adopt measures to implement this ap-
proach immediately. Over the longer run, this approach is a via-
ble option for other states and the Federal Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA). But it is also legally powerful. By 
preventing future regulatory takings claims, it preserves im-
portant policy flexibility for future governments facing an in-
creasingly dire need to respond to the threat of climate change. 
It will also blunt political opposition to the inevitable regulations 
because it amounts to a kind of bargain for temporary regulatory 
forbearance that recalibrates what counts as fair treatment in 
the future. We recognize that recent political events make ag-
gressive EPA or other federal action unlikely in the near term, 
even if costs are not borne until far into the future. After intro-
ducing the idea, we therefore focus specifically on ways in which 
state regulators could implement prospective grandfathering, 
particularly in conjunction with accelerated cost recovery in en-
ergy rates. 
 
 23. In energy policy, this resembles allowing recovery for stranded costs. 
For an excellent analysis of the problem in these terms, see Emily Hammond & 
Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645 
(2017). 
 24. Sunrise provisions have previously been explored in the context of con-
stitutional rules. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITU-
TION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 476 (2012) (“A close look 
at the original Constitution and its amendments reveals clever, albeit too-rare, 
use of the sunrise device to overcome immediate entrenched interests and in-
justices and thereby achieve a more disinterested and just future state of af-
fairs.”); see also Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Demo-
cratic, but Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975 (2015) (analyzing sunrise provisions in the U.S. Constitu-
tion). 
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Legal scholars and political scientists voice a persistent 
worry about the entrenching effect of government actions.25 Gov-
ernments frequently act in ways that limit policy choices in the 
future, often imposing significant costs on subsequent genera-
tions.26 This Article ultimately argues that we have a unique op-
portunity to do the opposite: to act today to preserve policy 
choices for future governments. And it argues that the stakes are 
so high when it comes to energy policy that even a small effect 
on future regulatory incentives may make the difference be-
tween a sustainable and unsustainable future. 
Part I surveys the leading contemporary literature on cli-
mate change and the need for reducing carbon emissions. Part I 
also introduces the important role that natural gas can play in 
our energy infrastructure, but for a limited time. Part II then 
anticipates the takings challenges that the natural gas industry 
is likely to raise when faced with regulatory actions decades from 
now. It argues that takings liability is unlikely, but nevertheless 
concludes that there is, in fact, a chance that necessary regula-
tions in the future may violate the Takings Clause—or at least 
that fear of takings claims will discourage policymakers from 
adopting such regulations. Part III then proposes several re-
sponses that public and private actors could implement today 
that would reduce, if not eliminate, that risk of takings liability 
in the future. These include setting reasonable expectations for 
the longevity of investments in natural gas and prospective 
grandfathering, possibly through accelerated cost recovery for 
natural gas infrastructure. Part III also explains how prospec-
tive grandfathering could usefully apply in other contexts. 
 
 25. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment 
and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 402–04 (2015) (describing the paralyzing 
effects of entrenchment on labor and Social Security policy); Christopher Ser-
kin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 882 (2011) (considering how private law entrenchment 
can upset a “carefully balanced equilibrium between stability and flexibility”). 
 26. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: En-
trenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 384–85 (describ-
ing various ways legislatures can restrict future legislative action); Eric A. Pos-
ner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665, 1667 (2002) (defining entrenchment as “the enactment of either stat-
utes or internal legislative rules that are binding against subsequent legislative 
action in the same form”). 
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I.  NATURAL GAS AS A BRIDGE FUEL   
The approaches we propose to address anticipated legal 
changes apply in any context where new regulations are foresee-
able far into the future. But they are particularly appropriate 
and important for natural gas. This Part describes why natural 
gas is a bridge fuel and why regulations will be needed at the 
end of the bridge. This discussion is important because (1) it il-
lustrates a context in which legal change is foreseeable and po-
tentially problematic; and (2) as we argue in Part II, developing 
a record of reasonable expectations is one way of preventing reg-
ulatory takings claims in the future. 
A. THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS IN CLIMATE MITIGATION 
Electricity generation accounts for over 30 percent of U.S. 
CO2 emissions.27 Coal-fired electricity generation accounts for 76 
percent of electricity sector fossil fuel emissions,28 even though 
it provides only 18.5 percent of the electricity generated.29 As-
suming leakage and other emissions are held to a minimum, an 
assumption we make in this Article (although we acknowledge 
that experts differ on these issues), natural-gas-fired electric 
generation yields roughly half the carbon emissions of coal per 
kilowatt-hour of electricity generated.30 This difference arises 
because of a fundamental difference in the molecular structure 
of coal and natural gas; coal has only two hydrogen bonds, 
whereas natural gas has four. Since the energy release from com-
bustion arises from breaking these bonds, half as much energy 
is released from each coal molecule as from each natural gas mol-
ecule. 
 
 27. EPA, EPA 430-R-16-002, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMIS-
SIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2014, at 3-14 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/2017-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2016-main-text.pdf. 
 28. Id. at 3-5. Fossil fuel combustion is the primary source of energy sector 
CO2 emissions. Id. at 3-1. 
 29. Id. at 3-7. 
 30. Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage 
from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 6435, 6438 tbl.1 
(2012), http://www.pnas.org/content/109/17/6435.full.pdf; FAQ, supra note 6. 
International Energy Agency (IEA) figures indicate that, depending on the type 
of coal burned, coal-fired generation emits between 875 and 940 gCO2 per kilo-
watt-hour (kWh), while natural gas emits 405 gCO2 per kWh. INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION: HIGHLIGHTS 
147 (2016), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ 
CO2EmissionsfromFuelCombustion_Highlights_2016.pdf. 
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As a result of its low CO2 emissions as compared to coal, nat-
ural gas has been identified by researchers,31 government policy 
analysts,32 and regulators33 as a bridge fuel that can provide a 
transition from the coal-dominated electric generation system of 
the last century to one that is dominated by renewable or non-
carbon emitting sources. In other words, if natural-gas-fired 
electricity generation can substitute for coal-fired electricity gen-
eration over the next several decades, it can play a major role in 
reducing the contribution of the electric generation sector to U.S. 
emissions during this period. This trend has already begun to 
play out in the United States, where natural gas has steadily 
grown as a fuel for electricity generation; between 2005 and 
2015, natural gas-fired generation almost doubled as a percent-
age of total U.S. electricity generation, growing from roughly 18 
percent to more than 32 percent.34 The increase in natural-gas-
fired generation has been made possible by the prolific construc-
tion of new natural-gas-fired power plants, with even more in 
the pipeline.35 Although the U.S. Energy Information Admin-
 
 31. See MIT, supra note 17, at 2 passim (using the term bridge). The view 
that natural gas provides less carbon emissions, and thus can serve as a bridge 
to zero-carbon electricity generation is widely, but not universally, held. Some 
researchers have pointed out the substantial methane emissions from natural 
gas, and caution against its use as a bridge. E.g., Robert W. Howarth, A Bridge 
to Nowhere: Methane Emissions and the Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Natural 
Gas, 2014 ENERGY SCI. & ENGINEERING 1. 
 32. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011: ARE WE 
ENTERING A GOLDEN AGE OF GAS? 7 (2011), http://www.worldenergyoutlook 
.org/media/weowebsite/2011/WEO2011_GoldenAgeofGasReport.pdf (“[Natural 
gas] can provide the flexibility and back-up capacity needed as more variable 
capacity comes on-line in power generation.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Helman, supra note 11. Prior to his appointment as U.S. Sec-
retary of Energy in 2013, Ernest Moniz stated publicly that “natural gas is truly 
a bridge to a low-carbon future,” and that “in the very long run, very tight carbon 
constraints will likely phase out natural gas power generation in favor of zero-
carbon or extremely low-carbon energy sources.” Steven Mufson, Ernest Moniz, 
MIT Physicist, Nominated as Energy Secretary, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ernest-moniz-mit-physicist 
-is-to-be-nominated-as-energy-secretary/2013/03/04/e3fe68aa-808c-11e2-a350 
-49866afab584_story.html. 
 34. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC 
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.3.1.A (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/ 
annual/archive/03482015.pdf. 
 35. Industry data shows that over thirty-one gigawatts (GW) of natural gas 
electric power capacity was under construction in 2017. AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, 
AMERICA’S ELECTRICITY GENERATION CAPACITY, 2017 UPDATE, at 6 tbl.2.1 
(2017), http://appanet.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/APPA_Generation_Capacity_ 
2017.pdf. The EIA projects that 18.7 GW of new capacity is scheduled to come 
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istration (EIA) estimates that natural gas accounted for 27 per-
cent of U.S. electricity production in 2015, this figure is predicted 
to increase to 37 percent by 2040 as natural gas grows, and coal 
and nuclear generation subside.36 
Natural gas is a bridge, however, not a complete response to 
the climate problem. If natural gas displaces coal for electricity 
generation, a net carbon reduction from the U.S. electricity sec-
tor will occur, but simply transitioning to a lower-emitting fossil 
fuel will be insufficient to meet the 2C climate goal articulated 
in the Paris Agreement, much less the aspiration of 1.5 °C.37 The 
Obama Administration committed to reducing U.S. carbon diox-
ide emissions by 26 percent to 28 percent by 2025, and the tran-
sition to natural gas was expected to contribute the largest share 
of these emissions reductions.38 The challenge for regulators is 
that the U.S. share of the global emissions reductions necessary 
to achieve the 2C goal increases steeply to roughly 70 percent to 
80 percent reductions by 2050.39 In addition, the required U.S. 
emissions reductions will become even more stringent after 
2050; near-zero emissions will be required in the 2050–2070 pe-
riod and net negative emissions will be required during the last 
third to quarter of this century.40 The recently-announced Paris 
 
on line between 2016 and 2018. Victoria Zaretskaya, Many Natural Gas-Fired 
Power Plants Under Construction Are Near Major Shale Plays, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (May 19, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail 
.php?id=26312. Eighty-five GW are projected to be added through 2035. Natural 
Gas and Renewable Shares of Electricity Generation To Grow, Coal Still Larg-
est, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=4950. 
 36. See Annual Energy Outlook 2016, Table: Electricity Supply, Disposition, 
Prices, and Emissions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/ 
outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=8-AEO2016&sourcekey=0 (last reviewed Oct. 
9, 2017). 
 37. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, art. I, ¶ 1(a), 2015. 
 38. See Intended Nationally Determined Contribution Submitted by the 
United States of America to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/ 
Published%20Documents/United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20 
Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf. 
 39. Id. Consistent with the 2C climate goal, the U.S. Department of State 
has announced a goal of reducing net emissions by 83 percent below 2005 levels 
in 2050. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2010, 
at 3, 6 (2010), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usa_nc5.pdf. 
 40. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ANNUAL WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 150, 166 
(2015), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ 
WEO2015.pdf (showing an increased use of natural gas in nearer years, fol-
lowed by a decrease in later years to achieve a 450ppm atmospheric concentra-
tion of CO2, which is often associated with the 2C goal). 
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Agreement withdrawal41 and various domestic deregulatory ef-
forts may take some of the legal pressure off at times over the 
next decade, but these deregulatory efforts will only increase the 
need to transition away from natural gas by 2050, since even 
greater emissions reductions will be necessary over the 2030–
2050 period if these deregulatory efforts increase U.S. emissions 
in the interim. 
These estimates of future U.S. emissions reductions thus 
suggest that it will be necessary to phase out even natural-gas-
based carbon emissions by the 2040–2050 period.42 Similar tran-
sitions away from natural gas will be required in many other 
countries.43 Although steep emissions reductions from other sec-
tors of the economy could reduce the pressure on natural-gas 
fired power plants, studies suggest that efforts to decarbonize 
other sectors will face higher costs and other hurdles. For exam-
ple, a 2014 study by two leading laboratories notes that cutting 
emissions from sectors that rely heavily on gas and oil (for ex-
ample, motor vehicle use and air transport) would require re-
placing natural gas with biofuel and offsetting the remaining 
emissions with carbon capture and storage (CCS).44 We note, 
however, that “commercial or near-commercial technologies and 
limits on biomass availability and [CCS] deployment” make it 
“difficult to decarbonize both gas and liquid fuel supplies.”45 The 
electricity sector thus is likely to shoulder a greater load of emis-
sions reductions, and this research suggests that power-sector 
emissions ultimately would need to fall to zero.46 
If even natural-gas-fired power generation will need to be 
phased out by 2050, the bridge for natural gas should begin to 
slope down within two decades and should not extend for more 
 
 41. See Robinson Meyer, Trump and the Paris Agreement: What Just Hap-
pened?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/ 
2017/08/trump-and-the-paris-agreement-what-just-happened/536040. 
 42. See, e.g., JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL., PATHWAYS TO DEEP CARBONIZA-
TION IN THE UNITED STATES, at xi (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/09/US-Deep-Decarbonization-Report.pdf (predicting the attainment of 
“deep decarbonization” by phasing out natural gas-fired electricity generation). 
 43. See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND 
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE (forth-
coming Dec. 2017) (examining carbon emissions pathways and concluding that 
even if all of the countries that made commitments in the Paris Agreement ful-
fill all of their commitments, the resulting pathway has a low probability of 
achieving the 2C goal).  
 44. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 42, at 17. 
 45. Id. at xiii. 
 46. Id. at xiii, 14. 
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than roughly thirty years. The rapid installation of new natural-
gas-fired capacity, combined with the expected life of natural-
gas-fired power plants, however, could make this difficult. Utili-
ties will resist shuttering newly built power plants during their 
useful lifetime, which according to a survey of plants retired 
from 2000 to 2010, is an average of roughly fifty years.47 Assum-
ing that plants built today have a similar or even longer lifespan, 
this figure suggests that decarbonizing the electricity sector by 
2050 will necessitate the early closure of otherwise functional 
plants. 
Plants built before 2000 will be at the end of their useful 
lives as we approach the 2040–2050 period, but the decades-long 
controversy over the Clean Air Act new source review (NSR) pro-
cess for coal-fired power plants demonstrates that utilities have 
incentives to lobby and litigate aggressively to resist efforts to 
shutter plants that at least arguably were expected to close at 
the end of their useful lives.48 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970 and 1977 grandfathered existing power plants.49 The ex-
pectation of many at the time, and arguably the intent of Con-
gress, was that the power plants would become obsolete and 
eventually would be replaced by more efficient and cleaner 
ones.50 These newer plants were subject to more stringent emis-
sions standards, and substantial upgrades to existing plants also 
 
 47. Melissa C. Lott, Natural Gas—Leading Retirements, New Capacity, 
SCI. AM.: PLUGGED IN (Dec. 14, 2011), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/ 
plugged-in/natural-gas-leading-the-retirements-board (“[T]he average age of 
these recently retired natural gas power plants was 48 years . . . .”). 
 48. For an overview, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING 
FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” (2016). Revesz and Lienke 
note that the regulatory standards included in the 1970 and 1977 amendments 
to the Clean Air Act applied only to new power plants and grandfathered in 
preexisting plants. They conclude that the effect was to make new facilities 
more costly to run whereas old facilities—which Congress had assumed would 
retire after their thirty-year estimated useful lifespan—became more valuable 
precisely because of their regulatory advantage. Id. at 33. As a result, Congress 
grossly underestimated the effect of exempting existing facilities, and by 2012, 
over seventy-five percent of the grandfathered coal-fired plants had exceeded 
their expected lifespan, some by double. Id. at 33, 54. 
 49. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (2012) (applying the 
Clean Air Act to sources of which “the construction or modification . . . is com-
menced after the publication of regulations”). 
 50. See NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: REVIVING 
THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 14 (2003), https://napa.primedev.build/ 
uploads/Academy_Studies/03_02AbreathofFreshAirRevivingtheNewSource 
ReviewProgram.pdf (“Congress intended NSR to assure that new sources would 
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triggered the new, stricter standards.51 In fact, however, the 
ability of older plants to continue producing power without meet-
ing higher emission standards made them particularly valuable. 
Instead of slow obsolescence, the plants continued to operate far 
beyond what would have been their normal operating life.52 
Decades later, the Clinton EPA brought enforcement actions 
against heavily upgraded existing plants that did not comply 
with new plant standards. The enforcement actions asserted 
that the industry had made major modifications to existing 
plants without installing the required upgrades.53 These en-
forcement actions triggered a long, partially successful battle by 
electric utilities, which litigated against the enforcement actions 
and lobbied EPA and Congress to allow the plants to continue 
operating.54 The Bush administration later adopted policies that 
allowed the power plants to be improved without meeting the 
higher emissions standards, reasoning that the incremental im-
provement was better than nothing.55 
 
be clean, existing sources would become cleaner over time, and a moving fron-
tier of improved technology would be the benchmark against which ‘clean’ is 
measured . . . .”). 
 51. See New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding EPA 
regulations requiring construction permits for plant modifications that substan-
tially increase emissions). 
 52. See Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, The Tragic Flaw of the Clean Air 
Act, REG. REV. (May 17, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/05/17/revesz 
-lienke-tragic-flaw-clean-air-act (“[T]he economically useful life of a coal plant 
[when the CAA was drafted] was thought to be about 30 years. But by 2012, 
more than three-quarters of the nation’s coal-fired generation capacity had been 
in service for longer than that. . . . [A]lmost 40 percent of . . . coal-fired infra-
structure was more than 40 years old, and close to 20 percent was more than 50 
years old.”). 
 53. Richard Revesz & Jonathan Remy Nash, Grandfathering and Environ-
mental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1677, 1693 (2007). 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 1687–89 (2007) (noting the response of the industry to 
EPA regulations). 
 55. See EPA: New Source Review Is Hurting Power Projects That Would 
Improve Reliability, POWER ENG’G INT’L (June 17, 2002), http://www 
.powerengineeringint.com/articles/2002/06/epa-new-source-review-is-hurting 
-power-projects-that-would-improve-reliability.html (statement of then-EPA 
Administrator Christie Whitman) (arguing the Bush reforms would “promote 
energy efficiency . . . and modernization” and create “opportunities for pollution 
prevention and energy efficiency”); see also Dana Joel Gattuso, Why the New 
Source Review Program Needs Reform: A Primer on NSR, BACKGROUNDER (The 
Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Feb. 21, 2002, at 1, 2, http://www.heritage 
.org/environment/report/why-the-new-source-review-program-needs-reform 
-primer-nsr (describing the Bush reforms as “much-needed” and “not expected 
to roll back regulations on industrial air emissions”). 
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Assuming an average lifespan, a large number of natural-
gas plants built after 2000 will need to be shut down while they 
are still in the midst of their useful life. Between 2001 and 2015, 
the United States added 3213 natural-gas-fired generators56 at 
203 plants,57 representing roughly $130 billion in capital invest-
ments.58 Likewise, an additional 195 natural-gas-fired genera-
tors, representing roughly $31 billion in capital investments are 
expected to be built between 2018 and 2020.59 As the NSR bat-
tles of the 1990s and early 2000s suggest, these valuable assets 
will not be abandoned lightly.60 
Perhaps in an early signal of the conflict just over the hori-
zon, natural gas industry officials have described natural gas as 
a foundation fuel, rather than a bridge fuel.61 Furthermore, nat-
ural gas infrastructure includes more than just the power plants 
 
 56. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC 
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.4.3 (2016) https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/ 
archive/03482015.pdf (providing count of generators); U.S. ENERGY INFO. AD-
MIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0348(2001), ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 
2001, at 18 tbl.2.2 (2003), http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/ 
03482001.pdf. 
 57. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC 
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.4.1 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/ 
archive/03482015.pdf; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
DOE/EIA-0348(2008), ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2008, at tbl.5.1 (2010), https:// 
www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482008.pdf (providing count of natu-
ral gas plants). 
 58. Estimations for capital costs calculated by multiplying the most recent 
(2015) EIA estimates of cost per kW of natural-gas generator construction by 
net addition in summer generation capacity between 2001 and 2015. See U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2015 
tbl.4.2.A (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482015.pdf; 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0348(2008), 
ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2008, at 16 tbl.1.1 (2010), http://www.eia.gov/ 
electricity/annual/archive/03482008.pdf; Construction Cost Data for Electric 
Generators Installed in 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2016), https:// 
www.eia.gov/electricity/generatorcosts/archive/2013. 
 59. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC 
POWER ANNUAL 2015, at tbl.4.5 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/ 
archive/03482015.pdf; Construction Cost Data for Electric Generators Installed 
in 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 3, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/ 
electricity/generatorcosts/archive/2013. 
 60. The NSR controversy is ongoing. See, e.g., Art Fraas et al., EPA’s New 
Source Review Program: Time for Reform?, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10026, 10031–32 
(2017) (examining history of ongoing regulation and litigation surrounding 
NSR). 
 61. We have not located any official statement from a natural gas interest 
identifying natural gas as a bridge fuel. Instead, the industry stance seems to 
be that it is a foundation fuel that should support the U.S. economy far into the 
future. See, e.g., AM. PETROLEUM INST., 2016 STATE OF AMERICAN ENERGY 46 
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themselves. Natural gas transmission pipelines also represent 
significant investments that will have a physical lifespan that 
exceeds the critical period from 2040–2050.62 If natural gas is no 
longer usable, these pipelines will also lose their utility. The 
same is true of wells, although they typically have a shorter 
lifespan.63 Nevertheless, we can anticipate that at least some 
wells could remain active and productive beyond the viability of 
natural gas as a source of power. In sum, policymakers today are 
on notice that the owners and operators of natural gas power 
plants and related infrastructure will fight vigorously to extend 
the bridge far beyond what is needed for climate policy. 
B. THE REGULATORY RESPONSE TO NATURAL GAS 
Policymakers will have several options to induce the phase-
out of natural-gas-fired power plants by 2050, actions that would 
 
(2016), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/SOAE-2016/API-2016-SOAE 
-Report.pdf (“[T]he long-term trend is clear: We will need more energy, specifi-
cally oil and natural gas, for decades to come.”); Natural Gas Emissions, AM. 
GAS ASS’N, https://www.aga.org/policy/environment/natural-gas-emissions (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2018) (“AGA believes that natural gas is poised to serve as a 
foundation fuel for the U.S. economy for years to come.”). Marty Durbin, the 
head of America’s Natural Gas Alliance, stated publicly in 2015 that natural 
gas “is no longer a bridge; it’s a foundation for the economy and will be for a long 
time.” ANGA’s Durbin Discusses Merger Talks, Future of Natural Gas Under 
Power Plan and Methane Rules, E&ETV: ONPOINT (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/2027/transcript. 
 62. JOHN F. KIEFNER & MICHAEL J. ROSENFELD, INTERSTATE NAT. GAS 
ASS’N OF AM., THE ROLE OF PIPELINE AGE IN PIPELINE SAFETY 12–15, 25–30 
(2012), http://www.ingaa.org/file.aspx?id=19307 (discussing pipeline age and 
various factors that contribute to pipeline operation and safety). 
 63. Although the productive lifetime of natural gas wells varies across dif-
ferent plays, a conservative estimate is that most wells experience a decline in 
production of 40 to 60 percent over their first year, implying a productive life-
time of thirty to forty years. See J. D. HUGHES, POST CARBON INST., DRILL, 
BABY, DRILL: CAN UNCONVENTIONAL FUELS USHER IN A NEW ERA OF ENERGY 
ABUNDANCE? 54 (2011), http://liege.mpoc.be/doc/energie/carbonefossile/-~En 
-anglais/Hughes-David_Drill-Baby-Drill_178pages-31Mo_fevrier2013.pdf 
(showing production life estimates for Haynesville shale); U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383(2012), ANNUAL ENERGY OUT-
LOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at 59 fig.54 (2012), https://www.eia.gov/ 
outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf (demonstrating rapid decline of production in 
early part of shale lives). Production from some wells declines up to 80 percent 
over the first year, suggesting a shorter productive lifespan. See James R. La-
dlee, Natural Gas Production Decline Curve and Royalty Estimation, PA. STATE 
UNIV. EXTENSION, https://extension.psu.edu/natural-gas-production-decline 
-curve-and-royalty-estimation (last updated Aug. 8, 2017) (“The average first 
year decline rates across Pennsylvania appear to range from approximately 60% 
to 80%.”). 
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also affect transmission pipelines and wells. For instance, pric-
ing carbon via a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system could un-
dermine the economic viability of these plants. Direct federal 
regulatory requirements could include a ban on carbon emis-
sions from power plants or emissions standards that cannot be 
achieved through natural-gas-fired generation. EPA also could 
set the standards at a level that natural-gas-fired power plants 
could meet, but only with carbon capture and storage equipment 
that renders the plants more costly than competing forms of gen-
eration. Some have argued that the standard included in EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan for existing coal-fired power plants and New 
Source Performance Standards for new coal-fired power plants 
adopted this approach.64  
Although the 2016 presidential election has resulted in the 
withdrawal or suspension of several climate measures and 
thrown federal climate policy into a period of uncertainty, the 
climate problem is not going away, and over the longer term the 
federal government is likely to return to the regulation of green-
house gas emissions from power plants. In addition, the govern-
ments of roughly one-third of the states are likely to take addi-
tional steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.65 States in this 
group, including California, New York, and Massachusetts, (1) 
are responsible for a large share of U.S. power consumption; (2) 
have state climate laws that are unlikely to be preempted by 
Congress; and (3) are likely to continue to create regulatory in-
centives for shifting from coal to natural gas for electric power 
plants and ultimately to renewable sources.66 Many local gov-
ernments also have adopted carbon goals and some operate their 
own electric power plants.67 
 
 64. See, e.g., Nicolas D. Loris, The Many Problems of the EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan and Climate Regulations: A Primer, BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage 
Found., Washington, D.C.), July 7, 2015, http://www.heritage.org/environment/ 
report/the-many-problems-the-epas-clean-power-plan-and-climate-regulations 
-primer (criticizing the Clean Power Plan). 
 65. See GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR., STATE LEADERSHIP DRIVING THE 
SHIFT TO CLEAN ENERGY: 2016 UPDATE (2016), http://www.georgetownclimate 
.org/files/report/Final_GCC_State_Leadership_Driving_the_Shift_to_Clean_ 
Energy_11Nov2016v2_1.pdf (reporting the status of various states’ efforts to 
shift to cleaner energy). 
 66. Id. at 4–5, 17–19, 28–29.  
 67. See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PRO-
TECTION AGREEMENT 1 (2005), http://www.mayors.org/climateprotection/ 
documents/mcpAgreement.pdf (listing steps municipalities will take to limit cli-
mate change). An example of a municipality that owns power plants is Austin, 
Texas. See Company Profile: Power Plants, AUSTIN ENERGY, https://z.umn.edu/ 
AustinEnergy (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). 
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These government regulatory moves are likely to be sup-
ported by the increasing demand for renewable power from large 
corporations. Many leading corporate electricity users, such as 
Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, have set stringent corporate 
carbon goals, and over 400 large corporations have adopted in-
ternal corporate carbon prices to steer internal corporate deci-
sion-making.68 These large buyers are creating demand for a 
shift from fossil-fuel-based electricity to renewables in many 
states, including states that have opposed the federal climate 
regulatory efforts, and this demand for renewables may expand 
to include smaller firms.69 Private climate-governance initia-
tives such as these will not force a transition away from natural 
gas on their own, but they may contribute to the long-term tran-
sition, as politicians take note and as utilities seek not only to 
respond to government regulators, but also to serve their largest 
customers. 
Regardless of the success of interim public and private ef-
forts, and regardless of the regulatory instrument selected and 
the level of government that acts, future government action may 
have the effect of eliminating billions of dollars of investments 
in natural gas power plants. We know today that these plants 
must cease emitting carbon by roughly 2040–2050,70 but if in-
vestors have expectations about extracting value from these in-
vestments they are likely to lobby heavily against these new pol-
icies. In this process, regulators and Congress may have 
 
 68. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 
40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 260 (2015); see also CDP, PUTTING A PRICE ON RISK: 
CARBON PRICING IN THE CORPORATE WORLD (2015), https://www.oceanfdn.org/ 
sites/default/files/CDP%20Carbon%20Pricing%20in%20the%20corporate%20 
world.compressed.pdf; Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmen-
tal Markets Within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 41–50 (2015); David Fer-
ris, Tech Giants Lead Campaign To Bring Renewables to Reluctant States, E&E 
NEWS (May 23, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060037674. 
 69. See David Ferris & Kristi E. Swartz, Southern Utilities Stand in the 
Way of Making the Internet Greener—Report, E&E NEWS (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060018386 (noting that “[b]ig tech companies 
like Google and Facebook are on the way to powering their data centers with 
renewable energy, but an obstacle stands in their path: the biggest utilities in 
Virginia and North Carolina”); Ferris, supra note 68 (discussing corporate mem-
bership in Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance). 
 70. Jeff Spross, At This Rate, The World Will Have To Cease All Carbon 
Emissions in 2040 To Stay Under 2°C, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 17, 2014), https:// 
www.thinkprogress.org/at-this-rate-the-world-will-have-to-cease-all-carbon 
-emissions-in-2040-to-stay-under-2-c (arguing that to limit climate change, car-
bon emissions must cease by 2040). 
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concerns about takings claims by the affected utilities. Regard-
less of the success of actual takings cases, the perceived threat 
of takings claims may be the greatest impediment to regulatory 
change. This perception has affected policymakers at the local, 
state and federal levels across many issues and is likely to be 
influential in the coming end-of-bridge debates.71 
Thus we are in the unusual position of being able to antici-
pate the end of the bridge even as we are building it. Are we 
smart enough to put policies in place that will allow it to end? Or 
will we lose the opportunity to construct an end to the bridge, 
leading to protracted conflicts and an increased chance of exceed-
ing climate emissions reduction goals? The problem is a tem-
poral one: Can we anticipate today the legal and political chal-
lenges to phasing out natural gas in the future? It turns out we 
can, and identifying these challenges also suggests important 
steps that we can take to ensure regulatory flexibility in the fu-
ture. 
II.  LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE NATURAL GAS 
INFRASTRUCTURE   
It is easy to imagine the legal landscape thirty to forty years 
from now. If current predictions are correct, the world will have 
nearly tapped out its carbon budget to keep climate change from 
reaching catastrophic levels. However, the American electrical 
grid will be dependent in large measure on natural gas. Renew-
ables will supply a larger share of electric generation, but a ro-
bust natural gas infrastructure will have been in place for dec-
ades, from wells to pipelines to power plants. Each will represent 
substantial investments, the returns from which will be depend-
ent upon the ongoing production of power through natural gas. 
If a regulator were to seek to eliminate those natural gas re-
sources, either outright, through the imposition of restrictive 
emissions rules, or through a carbon price, owners would almost 
certainly object.72 Everyone involved in the production, trans-
portation, and use of natural gas would likely try to protect their 
 
 71. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is 
There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 321–37 (noting 
the importance of perceptions by government officials that industry will relocate 
if more stringent regulations are adopted); James L. Huffman, Why Liberating 
the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public, 45 ENVTL. L. 337, 359–60 (2015) 
(quoting Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental 
Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 257 (2007) (“This private property rights 
rhetoric has cowered officials at every level of government . . . .”)). 
 72. See, e.g., Petition for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 16-1264 (D.C. 
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investments. And they would have at least some law on their 
side. 
The primary source of constitutional protection for property 
comes from the Takings Clause.73 Indeed, the natural gas indus-
try is likely to invoke the Takings Clause to try to shield itself 
from regulations that substantially interfere with its invest-
ments. A close look at the doctrine reveals that the Constitution 
should not, and probably will not, constrain future regulators. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion remains speculative. In the face of 
uncertainty, it is important to consider how the Takings Clause 
might operate to constrain what we view as the inevitable regu-
lation of natural gas. The discussion that follows serves an addi-
tional purpose, as well. By examining how the Takings Clause 
might apply to the future regulation of natural gas, it sets the 
stage for Part III and our proposals preventing takings liability. 
A. THE TAKINGS PROBLEM IN ENERGY TRANSITIONS 
There are two potentially relevant bases for takings liability 
that could apply to in-place natural gas infrastructure.74 The 
first is the per se takings rule from Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council.75 According to Lucas, a total wipeout of all eco-
nomically valuable use of property is always a taking.76 These 
 
Cir. Aug. 2, 2016) (featuring challenges to EPA’s coal-fired power plant rules). 
A carbon tax is the least likely to implicate property protection because the Tak-
ings Clause traditionally, if controversially, does not apply to taxes. See Edu-
ardo Moisès Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2183–93 
(2004). 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 74. We are confident that substantive due process protections will not apply 
to protect natural gas infrastructure from future regulations. See, e.g., Serkin, 
supra note 19, at 1256–58 (“After [Lochner] was overruled, substantive due pro-
cess protection for most economic rights all but ended.”); Mark Tunick, Consti-
tutional Protections of Private Property: Decoupling the Takings and Due Pro-
cess Clauses, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 899 n.59 (2001) (“Since the demise of 
Lochner, the Court has been reluctant to strike down economic legislation on 
due process grounds . . . .”). While modern courts have occasionally invalidated 
zoning regulations on this basis, the usual approach is still highly deferential 
to the government. For a summary and discussion of these cases, see, for exam-
ple, ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 110 (4th ed. 2013); see 
also DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SO-
CIETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 10–11 (1993) (describing the spectrum 
in state court deference under the Due Process Clause). 
 75. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 76. See id. at 1027 (“Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that de-
prives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensa-
tion only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner ’s estate 
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”). 
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total wipeouts are vanishingly rare. In Lucas itself, the Supreme 
Court reached its result only because the government had stipu-
lated to the fact of the total wipeout.77 Since then, governments 
have refused to make such concessions, and courts have almost 
always found that regulated property retains sufficient residual 
value to prevent application of the rule.78 We are aware of only 
one recent case in which the Federal Circuit upheld the determi-
nation of a total wipeout, and it was on an unusual set of facts.79 
Regulations that merely make natural gas more expen-
sive—even significantly so—will not trigger the total wipeout 
rule.80 Regulatory requirements like carbon capture and seques-
tration or a carbon tax might well make natural gas facilities 
less valuable, but will not rise to the level of a total wipeout un-
der current law.81  
Even outright bans on natural gas are unlikely to rise to the 
level of a Lucas total wipeout. Factually, it may be that natural 
gas facilities could be put to some entirely alternative use. If a 
plant could be converted to run on an alternative fuel, or the land 
itself turned into a factory or other use, then even a regulation 
eliminating a natural gas plant might not be a total wipeout.82 
Something along these lines occurred recently when Google lo-
cated a data center at the site of the former Widows Creek coal-
fired power plant in Alabama.83 Admittedly, though, such alter-
natives seem unlikely to be the norm. We presume—at least for 
 
 77. See CHRISTOPHER SERKIN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 266 (2d ed. 2013). 
 78. See, e.g., Pallazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630–32 (2001) (con-
cluding that $200,000 in retained development value constituted more than “a 
few crumbs of value” and so the regulation at issue did not rise to the level of a 
taking under Lucas). 
 79. See Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (finding the denial of a permit to fill a wetland, which the trial court 
had concluded deprived the parcel of 99.4 percent of its value, to be a per se 
taking under Lucas). 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 77–79 (describing limited applica-
bility of total wipeout rule). 
 81. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331–32 (2002) (holding that a thirty-two-month morato-
rium on development was not a total wipeout under Lucas); see also Walcek v. 
United States, 303 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding no taking under 
Lucas when a wetlands permit allowed development on 2.2 acres of a 13.2-acre 
parcel). 
 82. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 19, at 1229–30 (examining how the availa-
bility of alternative uses relates to the elimination of an existing use). 
 83. See Press Release, Google, A Power Plant for the Internet: Our Newest 
Data Center in Alabama (June 24, 2015), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/ 
2015/06/a-power-plant-for-internet-our-newest.html; Press Release, TVA, 
Google Chooses TVA Site for Next Data Center (June 24, 2015), https://www 
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the sake of argument today—that natural gas plants are useful 
only for generating power from natural gas. Moreover, it is im-
plausible to think that the property could be converted to many 
nonindustrial uses.84 Even an alternative industrial develop-
ment might require such extensive remediation and retrofitting 
as to be effectively impossible. 
Natural gas infrastructure includes more than just power 
plants. Pipelines also cannot be easily converted to transport 
other materials. The obvious hurdles are physical, but the legal 
ones may be equally important. Many pipeline companies do not 
own fee simple title to the property under their pipelines, but 
instead only easements over land held in fee simple by someone 
else.85 Where that is true, depending on how the easement is 
worded, the pipeline cannot be converted to different purposes 
without impermissibly expanding the scope of the easement.86 
For the same reason, the pipeline cannot be removed and re-
placed with another kind of transmission line, let alone a bike 
trail, walking path, or other kind of right-of-way.87 Therefore, if 
 
.tva.gov/Newsroom/Press-Releases/Google-Chooses-TVA-Site-for-Next-Data 
-Center. 
 84. See Sarah K. Adair et al., Considering Shale Gas Extraction in North 
Carolina: Lessons from Other States, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 257, 280–
87, 291–99 (2012) (discussing the various environmental concerns that arise at 
shale gas extraction sites); Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hy-
draulically Fracturing a Natural Gas Well, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 115–35 
(2012) (exploring the environmental issues with hydraulic fracking); Hannah 
Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 
229, 242 (2010) (“[A]ny oil or gas producer that contaminates a site with wastes 
other than petroleum or natural gas may be subject to future liability for clean-
up costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act . . . .”). 
 85. See, e.g., Alejandro Davila Fragoso, For-Profit Pipelines Are Growing 
and So Are Eminent Domain Battles, THINKPROGRESS (June 7, 2016), https:// 
thinkprogress.org/for-profit-pipelines-are-growing-and-so-are-eminent-domain 
-battles (quoting a pipeline company’s statement that ninety-six percent of the 
route for the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline was secured with easements); 
cf. INGAA FOUND., INC., BUILDING INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION 
PIPELINES: A PRIMER 19–23, 30–31 (2013), http://www.ingaa.org/file 
.aspx?id=19618 (detailing the process of easement acquisition for natural gas 
pipelines). 
 86. See Stew-Mc Dev., Inc. v. Fischer, 770 N.W.2d 839, 846–48 (Iowa 2009) 
(concluding that an easement originally granted for farm access could not be 
used for access to a residential development); Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 517 
(Wash. 1986) (“As a general rule, an easement appurtenant to one parcel of land 
may not be extended by the owner of the dominant estate to other parcels owned 
by him . . . to which the easement is not appurtenant.”). 
 87. Cf. Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is 
elementary law that if the Government uses . . . an existing railroad easement 
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natural gas is regulated out of existence as an energy supply, the 
pipeline transmission infrastructure may become valueless.88  
Even assuming for the sake of argument that government 
regulations in the future might effectuate a total wipeout of all 
economically valuable use of natural gas facilities, that wipeout 
may still not be a taking. The imposition of such a regulatory 
regime is actually quite similar to alcohol prohibition in the late 
nineteenth century.89 There, investments made in distilleries 
were suddenly rendered valueless when alcohol was banned. 
When one distillery owner in Kansas sued, claiming that the 
state’s prohibition on alcohol amounted to a taking of his prop-
erty, the Supreme Court rejected the argument in Mugler v. 
Kansas.90 The Court held: “A prohibition simply upon the use of 
 
for purposes and in a manner not allowed by the terms of the grant of the ease-
ment, the Government has taken the landowner ’s property for the new  
use. . . . And it appears beyond cavil that use of these easements for a recrea-
tional trail . . . is not the same use made by a railroad . . . .”); Preseault v. United 
States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1541–44 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a railroad right-
of-way could not be converted to a public recreational trail); Marcus Cable As-
socs., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 703–06 (Tex. 2002) (holding that an ease-
ment for “electric transmission or distribution line or system” did not permit 
use for cable-television lines). 
 88. Those individual property interests are not necessarily the correct de-
nominator for takings purposes. Severing the easement or the lease from the 
underlying land does not necessarily mean that these smaller interests are the 
relevant constitutional property. See Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then 
Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 562–
63 (2012) (“[T]he baseline for ‘parcel as a whole’ remains the deeded parcel.”); 
Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS 
L.J. 663, 694–706 (1996) (exploring the various dimensions of the denominator 
problem under Supreme Court doctrine); see also Murr v. State, 
No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL7271581, at *4–5 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2014) (char-
acterizing two separate but contiguous parcels owned by the plaintiffs as the 
relevant property interest and therefore rejecting the regulatory takings claim), 
rev. denied, 862 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2015), aff ’d, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192–93 (1967) (dis-
cussing the difficulty of defining the relevant property interest for a takings 
determination); Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a 
Dynamic Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 
34 ENVTL. L. 175, 190–93 (2004) (highlighting the “intractable” problems with 
“identifying the bundle from which a particular property right has been taken”).  
 89. See Lloyd C. Anderson, Direct Shipment of Wine, the Commerce Clause 
and the Twenty-First Amendment: A Call for Legislative Reform, 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 1, 5–6 (2004) (describing the nineteenth-century prohibition adopted in 
some states); Kenneth M. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: 
A New Look at Some Old Cases, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 473–74 
(1982) (reviewing the historical context of the nineteenth-century prohibition 
movement). 
 90. 123 U.S. 623, 668–69 (1887). 
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property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to 
be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, 
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation 
of property for the public benefit.”91 
The Mugler principle, repeated in subsequent cases, is that 
valid regulations designed to protect the public from harm do not 
violate the Takings Clause.92 As the public harm of carbon emis-
sions comes more clearly into view, the “evils” of liquor seem but 
a trifling delight in comparison. If Kansas could eliminate dis-
tilleries on grounds that it was protecting the public from alco-
hol, surely the federal government in the future can eliminate 
natural gas facilities to protect the planet from catastrophic cli-
mate change. While Lucas casts that sensible-seeming conclu-
sion into some doubt, we are hopeful that a court decades from 
now would defer to a legislative determination that carbon is 
harmful and refuse to find a taking on that basis.93 But given 
the state of the law today, we cannot predict that outcome with 
certainty.94  
Assuming Lucas will not apply, any regulation of natural 
gas facilities in the future will be judged under Penn Central’s 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See, e.g., Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 554 (Minn. 
1996) (“If the state regulation appears genuinely designed to prevent harm to 
the public and is likely to achieve that goal and the harm suffered by the prop-
erty owner does not appear to be one that should be borne by the entire commu-
nity, we will not find a taking.” (citing Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661–62)). Zeman 
went on to uphold an ordinance allowing the revocation of rental licenses for 
dwellings involved in three “disorderly use” incidents, stating that the ordi-
nance “serves a public harm prevention purpose and, properly implemented, it 
will likely be advantageous to all involved. Accordingly, we see no taking here.” 
Id. at 555; see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410–14 (1915) (deny-
ing a takings claim concerning an ordinance that prohibited brick yards within 
a city’s limits); Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 553, 573 (2012) (“Courts have long held that a government can prevent 
public harms without violating the Takings Clause.”). 
 93. Writing for the majority in Lucas, Justice Scalia sharply criticized the 
traditional “harm-prevent[ion]” defense from Mugler and its progeny. Reason-
ing that the difference between a harm and a benefit is “often in the eye of the 
beholder,” he concluded that the only defense to a total wipeout of all economi-
cally beneficial uses of land is that the regulation is consistent with “background 
principles of . . . property and nuisance” law. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1023–30 (1992). 
 94. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (concluding 
that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law tort actions by states 
against major utilities for greenhouse gas emissions, revealing unpredictability 
in courts’ attitudes towards climate change). 
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three-factor ad hoc balancing test, which focuses on (1) the char-
acter of the regulation; (2) the extent to which the regulation in-
terferes with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the result-
ing diminution in value.95 This test is notoriously difficult to 
apply.96 Each factor in the Penn Central test is contested, but the 
second prong—the extent to which the regulation interferes with 
property owners’ expectations—is particularly so.97 As originally 
articulated by the Supreme Court, the focus of the inquiry is on 
a property owner’s “distinct investment-backed expectations.”98 
Its purpose is to distinguish between those expectations that are 
particularly well crystalized (which should be protected), and 
those that are more speculative (which should not).99 The divid-
ing line for constitutional protection is not necessarily between 
existing uses and prospective future uses of property; the formu-
lation implicitly acknowledges that some prospective uses could 
still be sufficiently distinct as to deserve takings protection. But 
it clearly anticipates strong protection for uses already in place, 
like a developed natural gas infrastructure.100 
However, just one year after Penn Central, in Kaiser Aetna 
 
 95. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see 
also Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 307, 333–46 (2007) (expounding on each of these three factors). 
 96. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compen-
sation for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677, 741 (2005) (“Looking for 
consistency in takings cases is a little bit like finding shapes in the clouds: you 
can see them if you look hard enough, but they say more about the observer 
than [about] the clouds themselves.”). 
 97. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262–63 (1980) (holding that 
an ordinance only permitting single-family housing did not unduly interfere 
with the expectations of a developer who desired to build multifamily housing), 
abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); see also Daniel 
R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAW. 
215, 225–37 (1995) (critiquing Penn Central’s second prong). 
 98. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
 99. See Michelman, supra note 88, at 1233 (“The [reasoning behind this 
factor] seems to be that actual establishment of the use demonstrates that the 
prospect of continuing it is a discrete twig out of his fee simple bundle to which 
the owner makes explicit reference in his own thinking, so that enforcement of 
the restriction would, as he looks at the matter, totally defeat a distinctly crys-
tallized expectation.”). 
 100. According to Professor Frank Michelman’s famous formulation of this 
test, interference with existing uses of property tend to come with high demor-
alization costs and relatively low settlement costs. See id. at 1234 (stating that 
restrictions of existing uses generate “pain of a . . . demoralizing kind” that can 
be “identified by compensation tribunals with relative ease”). 
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v. United States,101 the Supreme Court restated the Penn Cen-
tral factors but with a subtle and unacknowledged change: it re-
placed “distinct” with “reasonable” investment-backed expecta-
tions.102 This alternative formulation allows governments to 
argue that even distinct plans are unreasonable. The focus on 
“reasonable” expectations principally serves to limit takings pro-
tection for unreasonable expectations regarding some future 
uses of property, like a property owner buying property in the 
middle of a residential area with firm plans to build a gas sta-
tion.103 Even if such plans or expectations are distinct—the prop-
erty owner knows precisely what he wants to build and has 
maybe even undertaken preliminary site preparation—they 
might nevertheless be unreasonable. 
An existing use is presumptively reasonable.104 Conceptu-
ally, however, a use that was reasonable when developed—
whether a tannery or natural gas facility—can become unrea-
sonable over time.105 This has long been true in the law of nui-
sance, where a benign use can turn into a nuisance as conditions 
in the world change.106 It should be true of the law of takings as 
 
 101. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
 102. See J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are Invest-
ment-Backed Land Use Expectations (Un)reasonable in State Courts?, 38 URB. 
LAW. 81, 85–86 (2006). 
 103. See, e.g., Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349–50 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (providing a framework to assess the reasonableness of an 
owner ’s expectations, based largely on the probability of regulation); Mock v. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 623 A.2d 940, 949 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (“As to the Mocks’ 
future plans, we further agree . . . that the Mocks could not reasonably expect 
to develop their land free from government regulation because it is riparian 
land, which has been subject to regulation for centuries.”); see also John D. Ech-
everria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 183–
86 (2005) (analyzing this reasonableness aspect of the Penn Central test). 
 104. In upholding the historic landmarking of Grand Central terminal in 
Penn Central, the Court noted that the regulation did not interfere with the use 
of the property as a railroad terminal—the existing use and therefore the pri-
mary investment-backed expectation of its owners. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (“[T]he New York City law does not 
interfere in any way with the present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a 
landmark not only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to 
use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years: as a railroad 
terminal containing office space and concessions. So the law does not interfere 
with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning 
the use of the parcel.”). 
 105. Cf. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705–08 
(Ariz. 1972) (finding a cattle feedlot, the location of which was not originally 
unreasonable, to be a nuisance given the development of a new community 
nearby). 
 106. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D, cmt. b (AM. 
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well, which increasingly incorporates a dynamic approach to de-
fining expectations.107 Under the Kaiser Aetna version of the 
Penn Central test, natural gas infrastructure should then receive 
less takings protection as the investments become unreasonable 
over time. 
Despite these arguments, tremendous uncertainty remains. 
The specter of property protection indeed hangs over many cur-
rent regulatory responses to climate change, even though our ar-
guments about reasonable expectations should apply today as in 
the future.108 Moreover, the diminution in value prong from 
Penn Central will continue to weigh heavily against the govern-
ment.109 Although regulations of natural gas facilities should not 
cause a total wipeout under Lucas, they will almost certainly re-
sult in a significant diminution in value. There is no automatic 
cutoff or trigger in the percentage diminution in value that will 
result in takings liability, but the greater the regulatory impact, 
the more likely it is to be a taking.110 The kinds of regulatory 
 
LAW INST. 1979) (“The defendant is required to contemplate and expect the pos-
sibility that the adjoining land may be settled, sold or otherwise transferred and 
that a condition originally harmless may result in an actionable nuisance when 
there is later development.”). 
 107. See Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty 
To Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 377–78 (identifying governments’ 
obligation to act in the face of changes in the world); see also District Intown 
Props. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(“[A]t the time District Intown subdivided the property, it knew, or should have 
known, that the property was potentially subject to regulation under the land-
mark laws.”); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (find-
ing the plaintiff ’s expectations of developing wetlands to be unreasonable “[i]n 
light of the growing consciousness of and sensitivity toward environmental is-
sues”). 
 108. See Laurence H. Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., Comment Letter on 
Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830 (June 18, 2014), 11–15 (Dec. 1, 
2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602 
-23587 (contending the Clean Power Plan effectuates a taking); see also Andrew 
W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation Justifies 
Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 251 (2015) (“[T]he dra-
matic expansion of regulatory programs necessary to avoid environmental 
harms and other social problems, in addition to facing formidable political ob-
stacles, risks running headlong into a regulatory takings doctrine.”); Jeffrey 
Dintzer & Nathaniel Johnson, Legal Risks of Fracking Bans Are Real, L.A. 
DAILY J. (June 24, 2014), https://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/ 
Documents/LegalRisksFrackingBans.pdf (examining the takings implications 
of restrictions on fracking). 
 109. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 105–06 (1978). 
 110. See Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review, 
20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 39 (2005) (analyzing the general percent-
age of diminution in value required by courts applying the Penn Central test); 
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burdens we anticipate becoming necessary in the future would 
significantly diminish the value of all natural gas infrastructure. 
A prelude to these anticipated takings challenges can be 
found in initial reactions to EPA’s Clean Power Plan, which is 
now in the process of being replaced, but was directed at coal-
fired plants. Although less sweeping in scope than the kinds of 
regulations that are likely in the future, industry was neverthe-
less quick to raise regulatory takings objections. In formal com-
ments to EPA on behalf of Peabody Energy Corporation, Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe argued that the regulation effected an 
impermissible taking.111 He pointed to the significant economic 
impact of the regulation, as well as the long tradition of federal 
support for coal as informing the industry’s reasonable expecta-
tions.112 Tribe’s comments evoked furious responses, and were 
pilloried by other academics. In a comprehensive reply, Profes-
sors Jody Freeman and Richard Lazarus—Tribe’s colleagues at 
Harvard Law School—called the argument “wholly without 
merit.”113 They argued that “there is simply no reasonable ex-
pectation to profit forever from activities that are proven to harm 
public health and welfare.”114 Even Professor Richard Epstein, 
famous for his maximalist view of the Takings Clause, found 
Tribe’s argument “wholly unconvincing” because “control of pol-
lution lies at the heart of the government’s power to regulate un-
der even the narrowest view of the takings clause.”115 
The invocation of the Takings Clause in the context of com-
paratively modest changes to the regulation of coal-fired power 
plants presages the fights to come, however. Change the facts to 
make new regulations much more restrictive and the economic 
 
Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and Envi-
ronmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 383 (2003) (“Yet, 
all else being equal, a substantial diminution in value might bring a regulation 
closer to a Penn Central taking . . . .”); Michelman, supra note 88, at 1190–93 
(“[T]he claim to compensation must grow more compelling as the disproportion-
ate harm increases towards immensity.”). 
 111. See Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., supra note 108. 
 112. Id. at 13–15. Tribe also argued that the rules were discriminatory in 
the sense that they unfairly burdened power plants that were reliant on coal 
more than those that were not. Id. 
 113. Jody Freeman & Richard Lazarus, Is the President’s Climate Plan Un-
constitutional?, HARV. L. TODAY (Mar. 18, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/ 
is-the-presidents-climate-plan-unconstitutional. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Richard A. Epstein, The EPA’s Clean Coal Dust-Up, HOOVER INST.: DE-
FINING IDEAS (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.hoover.org/research/epas-clean-coal-
dust. 
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impact much greater, and the Tribe of the future may well find 
himself with more allies, including judicial ones. We agree with 
the critiques of Tribe’s particular application of the Takings 
Clause, but we also suspect that the ferocity of the responses re-
flects an awareness of the risk of takings liability for carbon reg-
ulations. As unlikely as takings liability may be, the risk is real. 
The only certainty in the constitutional protection of prop-
erty is a significant measure of unpredictability. The outcome of 
any takings analysis is difficult to predict, and the resolution of 
the particular claims we envision here is even more so.116 Even 
though governments usually win, the nature of the ad hoc tak-
ings inquiry provides little certainty in any particular dispute.117 
Moreover, the takings analysis here is fundamentally a predic-
tive exercise, only slightly more reliable than gazing into a crys-
tal ball. The last fifty years have demonstrated that the substan-
tive content of property protection can change drastically over 
time.118 What counts as a taking today may not be one tomorrow. 
Or, more problematically, what would count as a regulatory safe 
harbor today may be eliminated by the time that our reliance on 
natural gas must come to an end.119 So long as the possibility of 
constitutional protection exists, governments in the future may 
well find themselves constrained from completing the process of 
decarbonizing our energy supply. This is as likely to be true for 
political reasons as doctrinal ones; so long as property owners 
have a colorable claim—whether or not it should win—they may 
 
 116. See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 90–91 (1995) (“The regulatory takings 
doctrine is a pernicious mess.”); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In 
Search of Underlying Principles Part I—A Critique of Current Takings Clause 
Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1316–17 (1989) (declaring that it is not only 
“difficult to discern . . . which test the Court [will] apply in any given case,” but 
that there is also “considerable uncertainty as to what each test means”); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1697, 1700–02 (1988) (criticizing takings jurisprudence as “judicially cre-
ated uncertainty”). 
 117. See James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit 
Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 62–68 (2016) (“[Under Penn Central,] 
[e]ach case is to be examined in light of all its facts and circumstances. Essen-
tially, ad hoc review doctrine empowers state courts to reach whatever result 
they like.”). 
 118. Penn Central was decided in 1978. The common law nuisance exception 
was created in 1992. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 
(1992) (establishing the common law nuisance exception); Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 119. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 74; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024 (cur-
tailing the harm-prevention defense “since the distinction between ‘harm-pre-
venting’ and ‘benefit-conferring’ regulation is often in the eye of the beholder”). 
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well be able to invoke considerations of justice and fairness to 
influence a skittish and politically responsive government. As a 
result, there are nontrivial reasons to worry that the develop-
ment of natural gas infrastructure today may well lock in those 
investments and make subsequent regulation more difficult, 
more expensive, and potentially even impermissible.120 Natural 
gas may well turn into a bridge to nowhere if building out the 
infrastructure generates property protections that discourage 
adoption of adequate climate measures in the future. 
B. PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY 
The path that we are currently on—doing nothing today and 
risking paying compensation in the future—represents an im-
plicit bet about the need for regulatory change in the future, and 
also about how courts will apply the Takings Clause to those 
changes. Many political actors today appear to be betting that 
future regulations will not be necessary. This attitude is con-
sistent with a denial of the basic science of climate change, a po-
litical (or normative) calculus that costs can and should be 
shifted into the future, a choice to ignore the problem altogether, 
or a gamble that some technological innovation or changed un-
derstanding of the climate system will forestall the need for fu-
ture regulatory intervention. We reject the first three of these 
“reasons” to do nothing. We accept the basic science of climate 
change, object to ignoring intergenerational concerns, and be-
lieve the need to focus on the problem is urgent. These positions 
are, in fact, embedded in our assumptions in this project, and 
they have received ample treatment in other work.121 
 
 120. The typical remedy for a regulatory takings violation is damages, while 
the remedy for a due process violation is injunctive relief. See Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005) (contrasting the remedies for takings vio-
lations and due process violations); see also Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 309–10 
(2012) (“[W]here the government violates the Takings Clause, the remedy is 
compensation for the period the violation is in place, but when its action de-
prives an owner of property without due process, compensation is not sufficient 
and the government action must be invalidated.” (footnote omitted)). 
 121. See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change and Natural Gas Dy-
namic Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1217, 1225–31 (2013) (discussing 
the potential for “path dependency” and the need for “breakout solutions”); Lin-
coln L. Davies & Victoria Luman, The Role of Natural Gas in the Clean Power 
Plan, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 371–73 (2015) (exploring the view that reli-
ance on natural gas could be a “dead end” rather than a bridge fuel); Patrick 
Parenteau & Abigail Barnes, A Bridge Too Far: Building Off-Ramps on the 
Shale Gas Superhighway, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 325, 326–29 (2013) (emphasizing 
that present steps must be taken to offset the “path dependency” associated with 
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We nevertheless recognize the fourth possibility: that no 
dramatic regulatory interventions will be needed in the future to 
decarbonize our energy supply. It is possible, for example, that 
market forces will propel adoption of renewable energy, either 
because costs of solar and wind energy continue to decrease sub-
stantially, or because the costs of natural gas extraction and use 
go up.122 It is also possible that technological innovations, like 
CCS, will turn out to be both efficacious and inexpensive, and 
that regulatory burdens associated with them will not be too on-
erous.123 But these possibilities, while conceivable, seem un-
likely. Markets are difficult to predict, but, as we argued above, 
the economics of natural gas make it likely to remain relatively 
inexpensive and therefore ubiquitous for a long time—even if 
adoption of renewable energy increases dramatically.124 Fur-
thermore, planet scientists characterize technological solutions 
like CCS as a kind of Hail Mary pass, posing enormous risks and 
viewed as a last-ditch effort at best.125 
 
natural gas). 
 122. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins, Using the Market To Ad-
dress Climate Change: Insights from Theory & Experience, DAEDALUS, Spring 
2012, at 45, 46–47 (“[R]eal-world experience demonstrates the power of markets 
to drive changes in the investment and use of emission-intensive technologies.”); 
Jim Murphy, Tipping Points: Carbon Rule Can Spur Clean Energy, NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2015, at 52, 53 (“[A] shift is clearly occurring as mar-
ket forces and more competitive prices are leading to a rapid increase in renew-
able energy growth.”). But see Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the 
Management-Centered Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 693 (2009) 
(“Market forces and shareholder empowerment will . . . be woefully insufficient 
to make corporations reduce carbon emissions unless regulation reduces the 
profitability of carbon-intensive business activity through taxes, fines, and the 
like, and/or by reducing the relative costs of cleaner technology through tax 
breaks or direct subsidies.”); Lonnie G. Thompson, Abrupt Climate Changes: 
Past, Present and Future, J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 101, 105–06 (2007) 
(“Market forces alone will not produce the big switch in energy resources that 
is required if we are going to significantly reduce our carbon dioxide emis-
sions.”). 
 123. See Howard Herzog et al., Cost and Economic Potential, in IPCC SPE-
CIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 339, 339–62 (Bert 
Metz et al. eds., 2005) (studying the potential for CCS to cost-effectively reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions). See generally Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path 
for Carbon Sequestration from Coal, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 211 (2009) 
(examining legal obstacles to CCS); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, 
Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability for Long-Term 
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103 (2008) (addressing potential lia-
bility from storing sequestered carbon dioxide and considering various liability 
options moving forward). 
 124. See supra Part I.A. 
 125. See, e.g., Christine Ehlig-Economides & Michael J. Economides, Seques-
tering Carbon Dioxide in a Closed Underground Volume, 70 J. PETROLEUM SCI. 
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If regulatory responses are required, courts in the future 
may give broad constitutional latitude to new regulations, as de-
scribed in the previous section.126 Notice, however, that there are 
parties on either side of that bet. The government may be gam-
bling that it will be free to act in the future, while the natural 
gas industry will be gambling on the opposite. Or, more pre-
cisely, the natural gas industry may be gambling that it will 
have sufficient political power in the future to prevent regulatory 
change in the first place, with the prospect of takings-based com-
pensation serving as a kind of alternative safety net in the event 
of new regulations. 
This is a complex calculus on both sides, and small shifts in 
the ex ante probability of losing a takings claim will have a sig-
nificant impact on the expected cost of a regulation.127 Where the 
economic stakes are in the billions of dollars, a change of even a 
few percentage points in the likelihood of liability will have an 
impact in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and make regula-
tion either more or less likely. Moreover, government actors are 
sensitive—perhaps overly so—to legitimate-seeming claims of 
property owners.128 Whether or not takings protection would ul-
timately apply, perceptions of fairness and illegality affect the 
political calculus.129 The presence of serious constitutional 
 
& ENGINEERING 123 (2009) (reporting on the impractically vast space necessary 
to store sequestered carbon dioxide); Gary Shaffer, Long-Term Effectiveness and 
Consequences of Carbon Dioxide Sequestration, 3 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 464 
(2010) (questioning the long-term efficacy of CCS). 
 126. See supra Part II.A. 
 127. See Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
75, 78–79 (2016) (“[A] risk averse government may choose not to enact beneficial 
land use regulations . . . that create a risk of litigation, even if the likelihood of 
liability is remote, and even if the expected value of the regulation is strongly 
positive.”). 
 128. Cf. David Dana, Incentivizing Municipalities To Adapt to Climate 
Change: Takings Liability and FEMA Reform as Possible Solutions, 43 B.C. EN-
VTL. AFF. L. REV. 281, 295 (2016) (“It is . . . arguable that local governments are 
not only sensitive to potential Takings Clause liabilities, but risk averse with 
respect to such potential liabilities.”); Serkin, supra note 127, at 110–14 (con-
templating the effects of takings claims on risk-averse government actors); 
Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments 
and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1666–70 (2006) (discussing the 
risk aversion of local governments). 
 129. Fairness considerations also affect the doctrinal analysis. See Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 46–49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just 
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.”). 
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claims makes the government less likely to regulate. Actions to-
day that (1) reduce the likelihood of valid takings claims; and (2) 
that defang claims that regulations are unfair and unconstitu-
tional will therefore have an impact on future regulatory incen-
tives, both by affecting the anticipated costs of takings litigation 
and liability and by changing the politics. 
Continuing on the current path therefore comes with signif-
icant risks. It raises the distinct possibility that the natural gas 
infrastructure will become entrenched against adverse regula-
tory changes, either legally or politically, even though there is 
widespread acknowledgement today that those regulatory 
changes will be necessary in several decades. Ultimately, we re-
main concerned that regulations will be necessary in the future 
and that the threat of legal protections will overly constrain reg-
ulatory responses. In the face of uncertainty, it is important to 
lay the legal groundwork to preserve policy flexibility in the fu-
ture. 
III.  PREVENTING TAKINGS CLAIMS   
When the legal system looks backwards, it sees the invest-
ments people have already made in reliance on legal rules, and 
generally seeks to protect those settled expectations.130 What we 
propose, however, is a set of tools to require the legal system to 
look forward. By building limitations into legal entitlements ex 
ante, it will be easier ex post to find that any additional reliance 
was unreasonable. The challenge, at the most general level, is to 
shift the temporal perspective of property rights and regulation, 
and to act now to preserve policy flexibility in the future.131 We 
argue that developing a record establishing the reasonable ex-
pectations regarding the lifespan of the natural gas industry will 
limit or eliminate takings liability. This should be relatively easy 
to accomplish today and requires little or no political interven-
tion. We advocate for that approach as low-hanging fruit. But, in 
addition, we also propose a new regulatory tool to accomplish 
 
 130. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Ap-
proach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1084–87 (1997) (describing the relevance of 
settled expectations and reliance interests in assessing the desirability of retro-
active laws). 
 131. By some measure, we are accepting the challenge to focus ahead of time 
on regulatory exit when designing current regulatory strategy. See J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Regulatory Exit, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296–99 (2015) (“Gov-
ernment should also ask how it will exit when it realizes it (1) has accomplished 
Goal X, (2) is not achieving Goal X, or (3) has regulated more than necessary to 
achieve Goal X.”). 
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this temporal shift: prospective grandfathering. It relies, funda-
mentally, on important limits on the legal protection of existing 
uses found in land use law. We consider these in turn. 
A. SETTING REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
As we described above, the Takings Clause does not protect 
all expectations that a property owner might have, nor even all 
investment-backed expectations. Instead, the Takings Clause 
protects only reasonable investment-backed expectations.132 
That is a substantial limitation when it comes to natural gas. 
Although it is reasonable to invest in natural gas infrastructure 
today—indeed, it is imperative—expectations regarding those 
investments should be temporally limited. Natural gas compa-
nies and their investors should expect future regulatory action, 
and those expectations should inform any subsequent takings 
litigation. 
Doctrinally, the reasonableness of expectations can be af-
fected by the foreseeability of future adverse regulatory changes. 
In Kafka v. Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, the 
Montana Supreme Court rejected a takings claim arising out of 
Montana’s decision to prohibit game-farm operators from charg-
ing a fee to shoot exotic big game species.133 Plaintiffs owned a 
game-farm ranch where the business model involved raising ex-
otic animals for hunters to pay to shoot.134 They alleged that the 
new regulation was a taking of their property. In rejecting the 
challenge, the Montana Supreme Court reasoned that plaintiffs 
should have known their industry was controversial and there 
was a likelihood it would be significantly regulated.135 Therefore, 
the plaintiffs could not have reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations in their ongoing use of their property as a game 
farm.136 Not every regulatory change is reasonably foreseeable, 
 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 102–07. 
 133. Kafka v. Mont. Dep’t of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 12–13 (Mont. 
2008). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 32 (“[S]ince appellants could have reasonably anticipated the 
complete elimination of Game Farms by the State or regulations that would 
make participation in the field unprofitable, they should have also anticipated 
that the State could make the operations less profitable by eliminating the in-
state market for fee-shooting.”). 
 136. See id. (“[A]ppellants could not maintain a reasonable investment-
backed expectation that they would be permanently insulated against the pos-
sibility that the Game Farm industry would be either regulated so as to elimi-
nate its profitability, or completely abolished.”). 
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of course. And “the mere fact that a business operates in even a 
highly-regulated industry does not mean that all regulatory 
changes are reasonably foreseeable nor that the business cannot 
have reasonable investment-backed expectations.”137 Neverthe-
less, courts generally examine whether future regulations were 
foreseeable when evaluating the extent of investment-backed ex-
pectations, and do not focus exclusively on the existing regula-
tory regime.138 
In light of this attention to property owners’ objective expec-
tations ex ante, it is possible to preserve future regulatory au-
thority by establishing an adequate record today of the regula-
tory lifespan of the natural gas industry. Information can have 
powerful legal consequences, an insight that has not been lost on 
public and private environmental policymakers over the last sev-
eral decades. Consider, for example, the use of deed notices and 
deed restrictions. This approach has been used to limit future 
uses of contaminated sites under both the federal Superfund 
statute and its state analogues.139 A site that will only be used 
as a landfill or a factory may not need to be cleaned up to the 
level that would be necessary if the site could be used as a school. 
Federal and state policymakers have responded by adopting pol-
icies that allow the cleanup standards to be determined based on 
the likely uses of the property, and to constrain those uses by 
placing information and restrictions in the property record re-
garding the site.140 
 
 137. Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 514 (2009) (citing 
Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 138. See, e.g., Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360, 
385 (2004) (“[K]nowing that Congress likely would eventually address the over-
capitalization problem [in the fishing industry], plaintiff risked that it could 
cease actively participating in the fishery and yet still receive [a benefit] under 
whatever regulatory regime was ultimately adopted to effectuate a decapitali-
zation. Things did not work as planned and plaintiff was excluded . . . not be-
cause the Congress failed to act in a reasonably foreseeable fashion, but because 
plaintiff miscalculated.”); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 268 (2001) 
(“Because the market can anticipate regulatory developments, it follows that 
reasonable expectations may extend beyond legal restrictions already in place 
and encompass the foreseeable creation of a new regulatory program or the ex-
pansion of an existing program.”), aff ’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 139. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (2012) (imposing deed notice and restriction require-
ments when federally owned sites are transferred); Industrial Site Recovery 
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-13a(2) (West 2015) (instituting deed notice re-
quirements in certain situations). 
 140. See, e.g., EPA, EPA-540-R-09-001, INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS: A GUIDE 
TO PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING, MAINTAINING AND ENFORCING INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROLS AT CONTAMINATED SITES 17 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
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Many types of public actions along these lines are possible. 
Regulators and other scientific bodies have already developed 
the research base necessary to create a reasonable expectation 
that the end of the natural gas bridge will occur by 2050. The 
five assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC), promulgated over the last twenty-five 
years, present ever starker warnings about anthropogenic cli-
mate change and the need for carbon limits.141 Domestic regula-
tory agencies also have produced reports that provide infor-
mation about climate change and carbon limits.142 To reduce 
uncertainty in the record, regulators could draw from options 
such as a clear statement of long-term prospective regulatory ac-
tions in annual regulatory agendas, preambles to legislation and 
regulations, permits, and deed notices for the land on which nat-
ural gas facilities are built. These are just examples of available 
options. 
Although public policymakers may not have the legal or po-
litical support necessary to act, private actors also have used in-
formation in ways that could address the end-of-bridge problem. 
For instance, in 1987, the Environmental Defense Fund used in-
formation to change the incentives and legal risks facing munic-
ipal waste incinerator operators.143 At the time, municipal waste 
incinerator operators were treating incinerator ash as nonhaz-
ardous, based on a federal regulatory provision that allowed 
 
production/files/documents/final_pime_guidance_december_2012.pdf (provid-
ing guidance on use of deed notices and restrictions). Of course, like all regula-
tory instruments, these are imperfect. The deed transferring what became the 
Love Canal Superfund site from Hooker Chemicals to the Niagara School Dis-
trict stated that “[p]rior to the delivery of this instrument of conveyance, the 
grantee herein has been advised by the grantor that the premises above de-
scribed have been filled, in whole or in part, to the present grade level thereof 
with waste products resulting from the manufacturing of chemicals by the gran-
tor at its plant . . . and the grantee assumes all risk and liability incident to the 
use thereof.” United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 
960, 962 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 
 141. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLI-
MATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Thomas F. Stocker et al. 
eds., 2013), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_ 
SPM_brochure_en.pdf. 
 142. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE 
ACTION PLAN (2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (advancing various policy initiatives 
related to climate change adaptation and mitigation). 
 143. The municipal incinerator waste litigation ended with City of Chicago 
v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994), and is discussed in ROB-
ERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 389–91 (7th ed. 2013). 
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them, in the absence of data, to “apply[] knowledge” of a waste 
stream “in light of the materials or the processes used” to deter-
mine whether it must be treated as hazardous.144 To reduce 
treatment costs, operators were assuming the waste was not 
hazardous and were sending it to landfills. Combined with lob-
bying and litigation efforts, the Environmental Defense Fund 
took the novel step of testing some waste streams, finding them 
to be hazardous, and sending that information, by registered 
mail, to waste incinerator operators nationwide.145 By destroy-
ing the ability to rely on a lack of knowledge about the poten-
tially hazardous nature of the waste, the information shifted the 
incentives of the incinerator operators even in the absence of 
statutory or regulatory change. 
An initiative that distributes information about the ex-
pected lifespan of natural-gas-fired electric plants could have a 
similar effect here. Environmental groups could play a leading 
role by collecting and disseminating studies and authoring re-
ports detailing the limits of long-term reliance on natural gas. 
Broad dissemination to corporate managers, investors, regula-
tors, and the public will make it difficult for industry in the fu-
ture to disclaim knowledge. At the very least, the expert studies 
cited in this Article and other studies discussing the need to treat 
natural gas as a bridge fuel will create a record of the reasona-
bleness of investment-backed expectations that can be used in 
takings litigation in the future.146 Regulators will be able to 
point back to this record evidence that investors in natural gas 
knew, or should have known, that their investments would only 
pay out for approximately thirty years, at which point the regu-
latory environment would be likely to change. 
In addition to the advocacy group initiatives we discussed 
above, several other private options are available to address this 
problem.147 For one, banks and other institutional investors 
have an important role to play. Already, many forward-looking 
financial institutions recognize the disruptive potential of future 
 
 144. 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (c)(2) (2017). 
 145. For a discussion of the Environmental Defense Fund’s letter to munici-
pal incinerator operators, see Elmer W. Lammi, Environmental Group Warns 
Trash Being Turned into Toxic Waste, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Mar. 12, 1987), 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/03/12/Environmental-group-warns-trash 
-being-turned-into-toxic-waste/7669542523600. 
 146. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (citing articles discussing 
natural gas as a bridge fuel). 
 147. For a discussion of private regulatory instruments, see Michael P. Van-
denbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2013). 
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carbon regulations and require borrowers to analyze and disclose 
how their investments will fare under a different regulatory re-
gime.148 In fact, in 2008, a group of major banks signaled the 
expectations of the leaders in the financial sector by adopting the 
carbon principles, a set of private guidelines that require pro-
spective borrowers for fossil-fuel-fired power plants to account 
for climate change regulations when conducting due diligence.149 
The carbon principles signaled to potential borrowers the need 
to account for regulatory limits on fossil fuel carbon emissions 
when applying for loans to finance new fossil-fuel-fired electric 
plants, and the principles could be updated to require borrowers 
to commit not to run plants after 2040 or 2050. If the banks and 
investors financing natural gas electric generating infrastruc-
ture are assuming some significant risk of regulation—which the 
studies discussed in Part I.A suggest may result in the nonvia-
bility of carbon-emitting energy by 2050—then those assump-
tions should again inform takings analysis in the future. The 
challenge today is to build and maintain an adequate record—
such as those developed through the enhanced diligence and dis-
closure required by the carbon principles—and to understand 
how those financial assumptions may be an important tool to 
preserve regulatory flexibility. 
Admittedly, there is a circularity to this claim. It implies 
that investors could help to immunize their investments in nat-
ural gas infrastructure by willfully ignoring the risk of future 
regulation. That circularity is actually inherent in the focus on 
investment-backed expectations and in takings analysis to-
day.150 Other scholars have identified the possibility that a prop-
erty owner can bootstrap a regulatory takings claim by overpay-
ing for property subject to regulation, because the purchase price 
 
 148. See MORGAN STANLEY, THE CARBON PRINCIPLES: FOSSIL FUEL GENER-
ATION FINANCING ENHANCED ENVIRONMENTAL DILIGENCE PROCESS 6–7 (n.d.), 
https://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/files//1500519_carbon_principles_ 
diligence_2.pdf. 
 149. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 68, at 266–67 (discussing the 
carbon principles). 
 150. This same dynamic arises in the very different context of the Fourth 
Amendment, which focuses on the “reasonable expectation of privacy,” but with 
more equivocal results. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 
(1979) (“[I]f the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide televi-
sion that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individu-
als thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy re-
garding their homes . . . . In such circumstances . . . those subjective 
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection was.”). We thank Christopher Slobogin 
for bringing this issue to our attention. 
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is evidence of investment-backed expectations.151 Precisely the 
same problem arises here. This is a problem in theory, but not in 
practice. Investors will not ignore genuine risks so as to margin-
ally increase the merits of regulatory takings claims if those 
risks come to pass. Takings liability remains unlikely, and will 
not fully protect investors in any case. And, fundamentally, the 
Takings Clause only protects reasonable expectations. Ignoring 
foreseeable risks does not make an investment reasonable. 
Our argument is that courts in the future will look back at 
the information that was readily available to power plant and 
other investors today when the courts evaluate the reasonable-
ness of expectations for investments in natural-gas-fired elec-
tricity plants and related infrastructure, and public and private 
policymakers today have an opportunity to reduce the uncer-
tainty in the record. Decades from now, faced with a takings 
claim, governments will be able to point back to this record as 
evidence that it was unreasonable to expect that natural gas 
would remain viable indefinitely. And the more attention this 
issue receives, the greater the impact on reasonable expecta-
tions. 
B. PROSPECTIVE GRANDFATHERING 
The advantage of information disclosure to establish reason-
able investment-backed expectations is its relative ease. Given 
the public and private options, it also requires little or no politi-
cal will, or even government action, to build a record that will 
help to immunize future regulators from regulatory takings 
claims. But information disclosure is not particularly strong 
medicine. The NSR debate discussed above demonstrates the dif-
ficulty of establishing the state of knowledge that prevailed sev-
eral decades earlier, particularly when creating ambiguity about 
that state of knowledge can affect billions of dollars.152 
It is therefore important to consider a stronger approach 
available to government actors today to preserve regulatory flex-
ibility in the future—what we dub prospective grandfathering. 
 
 151. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 97, at 247 n.126 (“A landowner may 
overpay for land knowing he has a chance at compensation if his expectations 
for development of the land are not realized.”); Lynda J. Oswald, Concerning the 
Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Tak-
ings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 121 (1995) (objecting to use of the purchase 
price to evaluate landowner expectations on account of this concern). 
 152. See supra Part I.A. 
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Understanding how it works, and the extent of its promise, re-
quires first examining an important tool in land use law for elim-
inating in-place investments: amortization of prior existing uses 
of property. 
1. Amortization 
Both the Constitution and statutory law provide extremely 
robust protection for existing uses of property.153 It is not sur-
prising, then, that zoning and land use regulations are usually 
prospective only; they grandfather developed property as prior 
nonconforming uses.154 The persistence of prior nonconforming 
uses can interfere with rational land use objectives, however, 
leading governments to adopt a variety of responses to address 
them. At one end of the spectrum, governments sometimes use 
eminent domain to take title to problematic nonconforming 
uses.155 At the opposite end of the spectrum—following the lead 
of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act—governments adopt what 
amounts to a natural-death approach; they constrain the extent 
to which prior nonconforming uses can be improved or rebuilt 
(and sometimes even maintained), but otherwise wait for them 
to die out.156 
Some states and local governments have adopted an inter-
mediate alternative for eliminating prior nonconforming land 
uses. Instead of relying on either condemnation or on natural 
obsolescence, they have instead opted for the land use tool of 
amortization. Amortization in this context amounts to allowing 
a prior nonconforming use to remain in place for some predeter-
mined amount of time before having to conform to the regulatory 
 
 153. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1232, 1242 (referring to statutory and con-
stitutional protections, respectively). 
 154. Indeed, in the context of land use controls, the original 1926 Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) recognized that “the almost universal prac-
tice is to make zoning ordinances nonretroactive.” U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT 2 
(1926). The difference between prospective and retroactive regulations in the 
context of land use regulations is surprisingly fraught. See Fisch, supra note 
130, at 1067–69; Serkin, supra note 19, at 1263. 
 155. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 476 (2005) (taking 
developed land by eminent domain is acceptable when it serves a public pur-
pose). 
 156. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1235–36 (citing Eunice A. Eichelberger, 
Alteration, Extension, Reconstruction, or Repair of Nonconforming Structure or 
Structure Devoted to Nonconforming Use as Violation of Zoning Ordinance, 
63 A.L.R. 4th 275 (1988)) (noting the variety of rules governments have imple-
mented to encourage the demise of non-conforming uses). 
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change.157 For example, when enacting new zoning prohibitions 
on adult uses or billboards (two common targets of amortization), 
the zoning ordinance may require property owners to come into 
compliance with new zoning regulations after, say, two years.158 
By giving this limited period of grandfathering, the government 
can then compel removal of the preexisting use without paying 
any explicit compensation. 
Both the use of amortization and the duration of the amor-
tization period are subject to constitutional limits. Although the 
source of protection is contested, courts typically review amorti-
zation under the Takings Clause.159 Courts in some states have 
prohibited the practice outright. They have reasoned that if a 
regulation would be a taking today, it would still be a taking at 
the end of the amortization period.160 Most courts, however, have 
upheld amortization under the Takings Clause. Of those, some 
have reasoned that the amortization provision is itself a kind of 
implicit compensation that satisfies the Fifth Amendment’s just 
compensation requirement.161 In other words, prohibiting the 
 
 157. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1236–37 (describing amortization). 
 158. See, e.g., Indep. News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 151 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (zoning ordinance compliance for adult use for eight years); World 
Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(zoning ordinance compliance for adult use for one year); David Vincent, Inc. v. 
Broward Cty., 200 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2000) (zoning ordinance compli-
ance for adult use for five years); Adams Outdoor Advert., LP. v. Zoning Hearing 
Bd., 909 A.2d 469, 473 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (zoning ordiance compliance for 
billboards for thirty days); cf. PA Nw. Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 584 
A.2d 1372, 1378 (Pa. 1991) (finding ninety days too short for an adult book 
store). 
 159. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1244–45 (noting that the majority of courts 
uphold amortization statutes through a takings analysis). Some courts view 
amortization through the lens of due process, asking, in essence, whether the 
benefits of amortization to the public outweigh the costs to the property owner. 
Id. at 1243–44. Courts in many states have upheld the use of amortization, at 
least in principle. But the sufficiency of the amortization period is then subject 
to its own due process review. The greater the capital investments, the longer 
the amortization period needs to be. See Margaret Collins, Methods of Deter-
mining Amortization Periods for Non-Conforming Uses, 3 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 
215, 218–20 (2000) (describing how to calculate amortization periods for recov-
erable costs). 
 160. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Mo. 1965) (“[I]t 
would be a strange . . . doctrine indeed [to approve a taking simply if it] was not 
too soon.”); see also John H. Clifton, Comment, Amortization of Nonconforming 
Uses in Pennsylvania: A Possible Remedy for a Zoning Headache, 79 DICK. L. 
REV. 235, 244 (1975) (characterizing Hoffman as holding that “[a] delayed tak-
ing of private property for public use without just compensation was still uncon-
stitutional”). 
 161. Serkin, supra note 19, at 1244. 
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existing use is, in fact, a taking that requires compensation, but 
the form of payment is the permission to remain in place for long 
enough to obtain a reasonable return on the investment. 
Other courts, however, have viewed the amortization period 
as a kind of reciprocal benefit analogous to the transferable de-
velopment rights (TDRs) in Penn Central; amortization blunts 
the impact of the regulatory burden by enough to prevent the 
regulation from effecting a taking in the first place.162 As the 
time horizon for regulatory compliance increases, the present 
value of the regulatory impact decreases. A regulation that 
grandfathers an existing use for a hundred years, for example, 
will have very little impact on the value of the property today, 
while a two-year amortization period will have a much more sig-
nificant effect. In other words, requiring regulatory compliance 
in the future will affect the value of the resource today, but the 
extent of the diminution in the present value of the property will 
depend on the duration of the amortization period. Applying tra-
ditional Penn Central takings analysis, amortization should be 
permissible so long as the amortization period is long enough 
that the regulation neither (1) reduces the present value of the 
property by too much; nor (2) interferes too much with reasona-
ble investment-backed expectations. If a property owner is given 
long enough before coming into compliance, the regulation will 
have no meaningful impact on present value or on reasonable 
expectations. 
Of course, zoning and land use regulations will not be the 
specific regulatory tools used to eliminate natural gas infrastruc-
ture in the future. Nevertheless, the same dynamics are at play. 
In-place investments—whether billboards or pipelines—repre-
sent crystalized expectations about the use of property. If courts 
find that they cannot be eliminated outright without violating 
the Takings Clause, the same range of regulatory options should 
be available. 
Both eminent domain and natural obsolescence are prob-
lematic in the context of natural gas. Eminent domain is very 
expensive. If the federal government were to seek to condemn 
natural gas facilities, the price tag would likely run into the bil-
lions of dollars.163 Indeed, our effort here to avoid regulatory tak-
ings liability is based on the assumption that governments in the 
 
 162. For discussion of the TDRs in Penn Central, and how they prevented 
the landmarking of Grand Central from effecting a taking, see generally Chris-
topher Serkin, Penn Central Take Two, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (2016). 
 163. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Appendix B: Natural Gas, in QUADRENNIAL 
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future will underregulate carbon emissions if forced to pay com-
pensation. Natural obsolescence has its own well-known prob-
lems: many prior nonconforming uses are especially valuable 
precisely because they are nonconforming.164 They will not die a 
natural death because the regulatory regime has granted them 
a kind of minimonopoly—the only bodega in a residential area, 
the only gas station in a retail area, and so forth.165 The same is 
true in the context of power plants, as the Clean Air Act NSR 
debate demonstrated.166 As we discussed in Part I.A, the end of 
the natural gas bridge has strong parallels with the Clean Air 
Act NSR experience regarding coal-fired power plants and other 
large sources of air pollution. Disagreements remain about how 
EPA should have treated modifications to grandfathered coal-
fired power plants that enabled them to run for decades after 
non-modified plants would have closed. Whether the Clinton or 
Bush Administrations took the appropriate regulatory response, 
the dynamic is clear enough: uses that are exempt from new reg-
ulations can become especially valuable precisely because of 
their grandfathered status.167 We predict that the same will be 
true of natural gas facilities. 
Amortization is a more promising middle path. It would ac-
celerate the obsolescence of natural gas infrastructure without 
 
ENERGY REVIEW: ENERGY TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION INFRA-
STRUCTURE, at NG-5 (2015), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/07/f24/ 
QER_Appendix%20B_NaturalGas.pdf (stating that “[f]rom 2004 to 2014, com-
panies made $10 billion in average annual investments in midstream natural 
gas infrastructure, including major pipeline projects,” to support increasing de-
mand); see also supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 164. See City of Los Angeles v. A.I. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1954) (“Until recently zoning ordinances have made no provision for any sys-
tematic and comprehensive elimination of the nonconforming use. The expecta-
tion seems to have been that existing nonconforming uses would be of little con-
sequence and that they would eventually disappear. The contrary appears to be 
the case.” (internal citations omitted)); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasona-
bleness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses—Balancing the Private 
Interest and the Public Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99, 109 
(1988) (“[N]onconforming uses thrived due to the protection from new competi-
tion given them by the zoning laws.”). 
 165. See Eric J. Strauss & Mary M. Giese, Elimination of Nonconformities: 
The Case of Voluntary Discontinuance, 25 URB. LAW. 159, 163 (1993) (“Unfortu-
nately, nonconforming uses were not phased out because the restriction on the 
development of similar uses in the area created a virtual monopoly, which al-
lowed the nonconforming use to flourish.”). 
 166. See supra Part I.A. 
 167. See REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 48, at 5 (“Once grandfathered, [as 
with the Clean Air Act,] lobbyists . . . work to preserve and enhance their legally 
created advantage.”). 
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forcing the government to pay monetary compensation. Amorti-
zation is traditionally a forward-looking doctrine, however, and 
is triggered by the date of the new regulation and not by the date 
the offending use was originally developed. The necessary amor-
tization period for adult uses in a zoning ordinance will be the 
same whether the targeted business had been in place for six 
months, six years, or six decades before the zoning change.168 
Regulators of natural gas in the future will not be able to point 
to the previous decades as an amortization period unless some-
thing is done today—or soon—to start the period running. What 
we propose, then, is a kind of prospective grandfathering, where 
utilities are put on notice that they will need to come into com-
pliance with anticipated future regulations and that the decades 
in the interim will count for purposes of amortization. Specifi-
cally, we advocate for a form of advance notice of future regula-
tion—what has been dubbed a sunrise law or regulation in other 
contexts169—implemented through a prospective ban or, per-
haps, through expedited cost recovery by state regulators. 
2. Sunrise Provisions and Prospective Grandfathering for 
Natural Gas 
In land use and zoning law, the mechanism for triggering an 
amortization period is to prohibit the use prospectively while al-
lowing some amount of time for existing uses to come into com-
pliance with the prohibition. This is entirely inappropriate for 
natural gas. Instead of encouraging the rapid deployment of nat-
ural gas, this approach would bring it to a screeching halt. As we 
said at the outset, it is important to embrace the conversion to 
natural gas, at least in the short and medium term.170 There is 
no reason, however, that the doctrine of amortization needs to be 
coupled with a prospective prohibition. Instead, the delayed im-
plementation of a prohibition will have the same effect.171 What 
 
 168. See Serkin, supra note 19, at 1237 (explaining that courts weigh present 
harm to property owners against public benefit to determine the amortization 
period). 
 169. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institu-
tions, 121 HARV. L. REV. 543, 561 (2007) (describing anticipatory legislation); 
see also Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24 (suggesting a framework for sun-
rise legislation). 
 170. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
 171. There is one important limitation to our proposal. We envision that in-
vestments in natural gas will continue to be made, and should continue to be 
made, for at least another two decades. After that, however, additional invest-
ments might not be sufficiently amortized before new regulations need to be 
imposed. As a result, for the proposals considered below, we imagine a staged 
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we therefore propose is, in effect, a ban on natural-gas-fired elec-
tric generating plants that is adopted now, but that does not ap-
ply until approximately 2050. 
This is not as unorthodox as it might seem. Many laws and 
regulations come with timing rules.172 Most familiar, of course, 
are sunset provisions that cause the subject legislation or regu-
lation “to expire by its own terms.”173 From tax rules, to the fed-
eral assault weapon ban, Congress frequently relies on sunset 
provisions to control the temporal reach of its laws.174 What we 
propose is, in a sense, the inverse. Previously explored in the 
context of constitution-making, a sunrise rule is the formal an-
nouncement of future legislation or regulation, following the ab-
sence of one.175 
In fact, such sunrise rulemaking is consistent with the old-
est forms of congressional delegations of regulatory authority. In 
exploring the nondelegation principle in administrative law, 
Professor Kevin Stack has identified its origins in a “contingency 
theory of delegation.”176 Early examples from the end of the nine-
teenth century involved congressional delegations to the execu-
tive “on a finding that a ‘named contingency’ had occurred.”177 
These included, for example, the power to impose tariffs if the 
President determined that “tariff-free trade with [a] country 
would be ‘reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.’”178 In other 
words, early congressional delegations of authority to the execu-
tive were often framed as advance notice of executive action in 
the event that certain contingencies were met. 
Contemporary examples of sunrise provisions are easy to 
 
adoption, where the prospective grandfathering is announced at T1, a prospec-
tive ban is announced at T2, and new regulations are enforced against all nat-
ural gas facilities at T3. So long as the time between T2 and T3 is adequate for 
amortization purposes, there should be no takings problem at T3. 
 172. Professors Gersen and Posner explored a variety of timing issues in 
both statutory and constitutional contexts, and labeled rules with deferred im-
plementation “delay rules.” Gersen & Posner, supra note 169, at 565. 
 173. Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009 
n.4 (2011). For a useful catalogue of the history of sunset rules, see Gersen & 
Posner, supra note 169, at 562 n.78. 
 174. See Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24, at 1982 (collecting examples 
of sunset provisions). 
 175. See AMAR, supra note 24, at 474–75 (discussing sunrise provisions as a 
way to effect constitutional change); Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24, at 
1979 (noting, further, the utility of sunrise provisions); see also supra note 172. 
 176. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE 
L.J. 952, 983 (2007). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892)). 
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find. In fact, they are much more common than their more dis-
cussed inverse, sunset provisions. Whenever a rule contains a 
future implementation or phase-in date, it contains a kind of 
sunrise.179 Perhaps the best-known example is EPA’s phase-
down of lead in gasoline, which the agency implemented in a se-
ries of steps during the 1980s.180 But there are many other ex-
amples, as well. 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards cur-
rently include some of the longest prospective rules in the United 
States.181 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) and EPA set the standards for vehicle fuel efficiency 
and emissions, respectively.182 The agencies gather input from 
various stakeholders to create the National Program for imple-
menting the standards, which are announced many years in ad-
vance.183 For example, Phase I of the National Program applied 
to model years 2012 through 2016, while Phase II applies to 
 
 179. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 305.13 (2017) (phasing in a ceiling fan labeling 
regulation over the course of two years); Prepaid Accounts under the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 
CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0031, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/ 
20161005_cfpb_Final_Rule_Prepaid_Accounts.pdf (delaying regulatory re-
quirements for two years). 
 180. See EPA History: Lead, EPA https://www.epa.gov/history/epa-history 
-lead (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (listing the press releases associated with the 
phases). 
 181. See A Brief History of U.S. Fuel Efficiency Standards, UNION OF CON-
CERNED SCIENTISTS [hereinafter CAFE History], http://www.ucsusa.org/clean 
-vehicles/fuel-efficiency/fuel-economy-basics.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) 
(explaining that 1975 legislation set standards for ten years and the 2007 legis-
lation proscribed standards through 2030). Most agencies enact rules with ef-
fective dates within mere months, and even those rules with a longer timeframe 
tend to fall within the two-year range. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 305.13 (2017) (al-
lowing two years to comply with the Federal Trade Commission’s labeling 
rules); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026 (2017) (allowing two years to 
comply with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s due diligence rules). 
 182. See 49 C.F.R. § 533.5 tbl.IV (2003) (setting mpg standards for light 
truck model years 2005 (21.0 mpg), 2006 (21.6 mpg) and 2007 (22.2)). See gen-
erally 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,854 
(proposed Dec. 1, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 85, 86, 600; 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 523, 531, 533, 536, 537) [hereinafter Proposed Phase II] (containing the 
NHTSA’s and EPA’s joint proposed National Program for model years 2017 
through 2025 of cars, trucks, SUVs, and other vehicles). 
 183. CAFE History, supra note 181 (relating how “the Federal Government, 
state regulators, and the auto industry established a national program to im-
plement [the] first meaningful fuel efficiency improvements in over 30 years”); 
see also Proposed Phase II, supra note 182, at 74,854–56, 74,862–65 (inviting 
comments from industry stakeholders and discussing stakeholder involvement 
in developing the program). 
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model years 2017 and beyond.184 The fleet standards generally 
increase steadily, but leave room for changes in later years.185 
Similarly, the Financial Accounting Standards Board consist-
ently and intentionally enacts rules with long compliance 
timeframes.186 And other agencies have delayed implementation 
of new rules in one-off situations to address specific challenges. 
For example, the phasing out of incandescent light bulbs and the 
conversion to high-definition television broadcasts both came 
with significant lead time.187 In both cases, Congress ended up 
delaying implementation of the law even further in the face of 
industry resistance, but the changes did ultimately occur.188 In-
ternationally, too, Germany enacted a ban on the internal com-
bustion engine in cars, effective in 2030.189 
 
 184. Corporate Average Fuel Economy, NHTSA, http://www.nhtsa.gov/laws 
-regulations/corporate-average-fuel-economy (last visited Jan. 31, 2018). The 
statutes guide the contents and timing of the rules implemented by the agency; 
NHTSA, for example, must consider “technological feasibility, economic practi-
cability, the effect of other standards of the Government on fuel economy, and 
the need of the nation to conserve energy” in its rulemaking. Proposed Phase II, 
supra note 182, at 74,897. 
 185. See 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(B)–(C) (2012) (explaining that the CAFE 
standards should increase ratably through 2020 and then should be set at the 
maximum feasible standards); Proposed Phase II, supra note 182, at 74,861 
(“NHTSA has a statutory obligation to conduct a separate de novo rulemaking 
in order to establish final standards for vehicles for the 2022–2025 model 
years.”). 
 186. See Accounting Standards Updates—Effective Dates, FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid= 
1218220137102 (last updated Aug. 2017) (listing effective dates up to five 
years); see also Mary Clare Jalonik, FDA Punts Calorie Labels on Menus for 
Another Year—Again, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/ 
news/politics/articles/2016-03-28/looking-for-calorie-labels-on-menus-not-until 
-2017 (noting that despite issuance in 2014, the FDA continues to delay enforce-
ment of menu guidelines due to industry pushback). 
 187. See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
140, 121 Stat. 1492, 1580 (2007) (setting a deadline for rulemaking for incan-
descent lamp wattage by 2020); Carriage of Dig. Television Broad. Signals: 
Amendment to Part 76 of the Comm’n’s Rules, 27 FCC Rcd. 1713, 1713 (2012) 
[hereinafter HDTV Carriage Rulemaking] (explaining the initial three-year ex-
emption period). 
 188. See Better Use of Light Bulbs Act, H.R. 2417, 112th Cong. (2011) (at-
tempting to repeal parts of the 2007 act); HDTV Carriage Rulemaking, supra 
note 187, at 1734 (describing steps taken to accommodate the economic impact 
on small businesses). 
 189. See Bertel Schmitt, Germany’s Bundesrat Resolves End of Internal 
Combustion Engine, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
bertelschmitt/2016/10/08/germanys-bundesrat-resolves-end-of-internal 
-combustion-engine. Similarly, France has announced a similar ban, to take ef-
fect in 2040. See Angelique Chrisafis & Adam Vaughan, France To Ban Sales of 
Petrol and Diesel Cars by 2040, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2017), https://www 
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These kinds of sunrise provisions are routine. There has 
been little scholarly work describing or characterizing them, and 
the justifications seem self-evident. By and large, regulators de-
lay implementation of rules to allow industry time to develop 
and deploy the technology necessary to meet the new standards. 
But our proposal is different. Our goal is not to give industry 
time to catch up, but rather to give it time to wind down. We offer 
sunrise rules as a way of easing the legal transition between the 
current policy encouraging natural gas, and our expectation of 
an eventual ban. 
Conceptually, adopting new carbon limits for natural-gas-
fired power plants to be implemented at a date far in the future 
should create immunity from takings liability. Ideally, the rule 
we propose would include a specific provision setting forth the 
amortization schedule for natural gas investments, a schedule 
that could even be implemented through expedited cost recovery 
and accelerated depreciation by ratemakers, described below.190 
The interim period—the years before the new regulations come 
into effect—will then count as an explicit amortization period. 
Investors will be on notice that they have approximately thirty 
years to recoup their investments, and cannot complain when 
new carbon limits are ultimately implemented. 
Even in the absence of an explicit trigger, sunrise rules 
should create de facto amortization. Whether grandfathering 
happens retroactively, as is typical, or prospectively, as we pro-
pose, the effect on investors is precisely the same. It should not 
matter whether the amortization period is triggered by a new 
prohibition coupled with a temporary reprieve to come into com-
pliance, or by advanced notice of a future prohibition coupled 
with a reprieve in the interim. In either case, investors are given 
advance notice that their investments will come to an end at a 
prespecified time, and that the time between enactment and im-
plementation is intended to smooth the costs of the eventual pro-
hibition. In the language of the Takings Clause, the prospective 
grandfathering we propose eases the costs of the legal transition 
by leveling it out over a long period.191 
 
.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/06/france-ban-petrol-diesel-cars-2040 
-emmanuel-macron-volvo. 
 190. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 191. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 1, 3 (2003) (“Regulatory takings claims are fundamentally conflicts over legal 
transitions.”); Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Le-
gal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 216–18 (2003) (arguing for 
 1066 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1019 
 
Indeed, the complex interaction of discount rates and stat-
utes of limitations may even preclude takings challenges. De-
layed implementation of a legal change blunts the economic im-
pact of that change. If the natural gas industry were to challenge 
our proposed sunrise rule on the date of enactment, it would al-
most certainly fail the Penn Central test because the resulting 
diminution in value, and the extent of interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations, would be discounted to present value. 
This is precisely the same reasoning used to uphold amortization 
provisions generally. The effect of the new rule thirty years from 
now will be small enough to survive Penn Central analysis.192 
Importantly, however, the natural gas industry also would not 
be able to wait until the date of implementation to sue because 
of statute of limitations problems. The statute of limitations for 
takings claims is generally six years from the date the claim ac-
crues.193 For facial takings claims, and the kind of clear-cut rule 
we propose, that accrual date should be the date of enactment 
and not the date of implementation.194 
 
transition policies for regulatory takings of private property as a type of “gov-
ernment-provided insurance”); Edan Rotenberg, Ending Both Forms of Grand-
fathering in Environmental Law, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10717, 10719 (2007) (ex-
plaining that grandfathering compensates property owners for legal 
transitions). 
 192. Imagine that the financial impact thirty years from now will be in the 
billions of dollars. That loss might not result in a significant diminution in value 
today. The discounted present value of a billion dollars thirty years in the future 
is approximately $170 million (using a six percent interest rate). Although this 
is a lot of money, it represents a small fraction (less than one-fifth) of the even-
tual loss. The value of the entire natural gas industry that would be affected by 
the end of the natural gas bridge, if discounted in this way, would represent a 
loss today of less than twenty percent, which should not rise to the level of a 
taking under Penn Central. 
 193. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012). In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 
the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations of any action in the Court 
of Claims is jurisdictional; thus, it may not be tolled, and it must be considered 
by the court sua sponte. 522 U.S. 130, 134–35 (2008) (citing Finn v. United 
States, 123 U.S. 227, 232 (1887)). Due to the fact-sensitive nature of takings 
claims, however, courts will dismiss a case based on the statute of limitations 
only if more than six years has passed since the taking could not have been in 
controversy. Ewald v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 378, 382 (1988). 
 194. See, e.g., Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687–88 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (finding that a statute’s enactment triggered the statute of limita-
tions); see also Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Fed-
eral Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 27 n.112 (1995); cf. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: 
Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 28 (“The taking therefore oc-
curs not at the time of the final judicial determination, but at the earlier mo-
ment when the regulation was first placed into effect.”); Gregory M. Stein, Pin-
pointing the Beginning and Ending of a Temporary Regulatory Taking, 
70 WASH. L. REV. 953 (1995) (discussing when statutes of limitations begin to 
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In short, where the implementation date is pushed off far 
into the future, sunrise lawmaking will not have a significant 
enough impact when discounted to present value to violate the 
Takings Clause, and by the time it would have such an impact, 
the statute of limitations will have run. This outcome is not some 
kind of perverse trap for the natural gas industry, but instead 
follows naturally from substantive takings law. Where legal 
transitions occur over a long enough period of time so that prop-
erty owners can adjust to legal changes, there should be no tak-
ings protection.195 
It is not surprising that the relationship between timing 
rules and the Takings Clause has not been explored before. None 
of the sunrise provisions we have identified even implicate the 
Takings Clause. If the underlying regulation would not create a 
takings claim, there is no reason to consider how delaying imple-
mentation would change the takings calculus. Moreover, most 
sunrise provisions are too short to provide the kind of immunity 
that our proposal would create because they do not provide for 
adequate amortization. The duration we envision is extremely 
unusual. Most implementation dates are measured by months or 
maybe years from the adoption of a rule.196 Ours is measured in 
decades. 
Nevertheless, there are informative analogies. Our proposal 
bears a surprising resemblance to municipal street mapping. 
Many municipalities identify the location for future streets well 
in advance of building them. In fact, in some instances, streets 
are mapped decades before they are actually built—if they are 
ever built at all. But the act of mapping the streets is important 
because it puts property owners on notice that the streets may 
be built, and so can remove the need to pay compensation for any 
structures built where a street was already mapped.197 If and 
 
run). 
 195. This is contrary to an assumption by Professors Gersen and Posner, 
who argued in their theoretical discussion of timing rules for legislation that 
delaying implementation of a rule does not constitute compensation. Gersen & 
Posner, supra note 169, at 584. In fact, it should. As prospective grandfathering, 
if the delay is long enough to constitute adequate amortization, it should pre-
vent the ultimate implementation of a law or regulation from effecting a taking. 
 196. It is interesting to note that the EPA’s lead phase-down continued for 
roughly a decade, and Article I, Section 9 of the U. S. Constitution prohibited 
congressional interference with the slave trade for twenty years after ratifica-
tion. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 24, 
at 2015, 2018–19 (discussing this example as a sunrise provision). 
 197. See In re Furman St., 17 Wend. 649, 655–56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (find-
ing that the street plan provided notice to residents and landowners were not 
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when the municipality actually builds the street, it will have to 
pay compensation for the underlying land, but not for improve-
ments on the land.198 Advance notice of the possibility of regula-
tions in the future has a similar effect. 
3. Implementing Prospective Grandfathering: Accelerated 
Depreciation 
In theory, the most straightforward way to implement pro-
spective grandfathering is for Congress to enact a statute that 
imposes new regulations on natural gas with an implementation 
date three decades from now, coupled with an explicit provision 
that the interim period counts as amortization. For instance, 
Congress could mandate that EPA adopt regulations to be im-
plemented by some date certain, either specifying the carbon 
emission limits itself or, more plausibly, instructing EPA to 
adopt significant carbon limits by 2040 or 2050. Unfortunately, 
this seems wholly implausible. Congress had shown little will-
ingness to regulate carbon in any meaningful way before the 
2016 election, and any hope of near-term congressional action 
seems unrealistic. 
Only slightly more likely would be for EPA to adopt a sun-
rise rule prohibiting natural gas in the future under its existing 
Clean Air Act authority. Before the 2016 election, the agency 
promulgated new source performance standards for fossil-fuel-
fired power plants, and before the recent EPA regulatory shifts 
our approach would simply have required EPA to add the steeper 
future emissions reduction requirements to its current regula-
tions.199 This would raise questions about the authority to do so 
under the Clean Air Act, the calculation of costs and benefits un-
der the executive orders on regulatory reviews and other issues, 
but these are beyond the scope of this Article. Our point is that 
a regulatory option is conceptually a plausible approach to pro-
spective grandfathering. 
 
owed compensation for erecting structures that failed to comply with the public 
plan). But see Trent Andrews, Comment, Official Maps and the Regulatory Tak-
ings Problem: A Legislative Solution, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 2251, 2253–58 (de-
scribing unpredictability of cases, and some that found the act of adopting an 
official map to be regulatory takings because of the immediate impact of the 
map on property values). 
 198. See In re Furman St., 17 Wend. at 657, 660 (noting that while landown-
ers could be compensated for the reasonable value of their land, they could not 
extract exorbitant sums from the public by building extravagant structures). 
 199. See Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (establishing standards for fossil-fuel-fired units). 
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Of course, any near-term EPA carbon regulations became 
extremely unlikely following the 2016 presidential election. 
Even with the political benefits of our approach—discussed be-
low200—we do not expect EPA to adopt new regulations of carbon 
emissions anytime in the near future. That puts increasing pres-
sure on the states, which do, in fact, have a number of paths for 
implementing prospective grandfathering.201 
Most obviously, state utility regulators could introduce the 
same kind of sunrise rulemaking that is available to EPA. The 
mechanics will vary state by state, and not every agency has an 
obvious way to phase out natural gas power plants far in the fu-
ture. Just as problematically, the politics surrounding state util-
ity regulation may prove difficult to overcome. That political 
landscape changes, however, if states can offer the natural gas 
industry a short-term or medium-term benefit in exchange for 
losing property protection far in the future. Regulators could 
therefore also create prospective grandfathering by providing 
additional money ex ante as a way of accelerating amortization. 
Importantly, this is not the compensation that would be re-
quired if the regulation effected a taking. Following the logic of 
amortization, it is a kind of ex ante payment that is then in-
cluded for purposes of assessing diminution in value; it prevents 
a future regulation from being a taking at all.202 This reasoning 
mirrors the justifications for upholding amortization, and it 
should insulate any regulator from future takings liability. 
There are also any number of ways of providing an ex ante 
payment. Outright tax benefits would be the most straightfor-
ward. Indeed, it is arguably the case that the enormous tax ben-
efits currently provided to the natural gas industry—and the en-
ergy sector as a whole—should make compensation unnecessary 
for any future regulation already.203 Doctrinally, however, courts 
have kept takings and taxing in conceptually separate catego-
 
 200. See infra Part III.C. 
 201. It also puts increasing pressure on private governance, as one of us has 
recently been arguing. See generally Vandenbergh, supra note 147 (suggesting 
that private governance is an increasingly important component of modern en-
vironmental governance). 
 202. This is the same logic that applies to transferable development rights. 
See generally Serkin, supra note 162 (discussing TDRs). 
 203. See generally Tracey M. Roberts, Picking Winners and Losers: A Struc-
tural Examination of Tax Subsidies to the Energy Industry, 41 COLUM. J. EN-
VTL. L. 63 (2016) (identifying the extent of tax subsidies to fossil fuel companies). 
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ries; they are likely to be reluctant to count favorable tax treat-
ment as an offsetting benefit for purposes of takings analysis.204 
Nor are tax credits or other tax benefits conditioned on relin-
quishing takings claims in the future. The mere fact of favorable 
tax treatment should be enough to trigger prospective grandfa-
thering, but doctrinally may not be. 
Prospective grandfathering can be triggered in other ways 
that are more closely tied to the underlying rationale of amorti-
zation and that are therefore more promising. The most intri-
guing, and therefore the one we explore in depth below, is for 
state utility regulators to exercise their ratemaking authority to 
trigger prospective grandfathering. This is primarily by way of 
example; other approaches would work as well. But ratemaking 
is a particularly effective and appropriate approach in this set-
ting. 
Ratemaking by utility regulators is a complex topic. The de-
tails fill volumes and go far beyond what we can address here.205 
But in broad form, utility regulators set rates by identifying the 
total revenue that the utility will require and spreading that rev-
enue over the customer base.206 The total revenue required will 
include the marginal cost of the power itself, as well as a reason-
able rate of return on the costs of capital improvements, like the 
development of infrastructure or a new plant. Capital costs can 
be included in the base rate for customers, and will be spread out 
over the projected useful life of the capital asset.207 So, for exam-
ple, the marginal cost (that is, the production cost) of each kWh 
 
 204. Cf. generally Peñalver, supra note 72 (discussing relationship between 
taxes and the Takings Clause). 
 205. See, e.g., Jeremy Knee, Rational Electricity Regulation: Environmental 
Impacts and the “Public Interest”, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 739, 747–51 (2011) (detail-
ing the history of ratemaking); Ari Peskoe, Unjust, Unreasonable, and Unduly 
Discriminatory: Electric Utility Rates and the Campaign Against Rooftop Solar, 
11 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY L. 211, 263–74 (2016) (summarizing recent rate-
making proceedings concerning ratemaking subsidies); Jim Rossi, The Political 
Economy of Energy and Its Implications for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 379, 390–93 (2009) (exploring the ratemaking process). 
 206. See, e.g., Lino Mendiola, The Erosion of Traditional Ratemaking 
Through the Use of Special Rates, Riders, and Other Mechanisms, 10 TEX. TECH 
ADMIN. L.J. 173, 173 (2008) (“In a traditional model of ratemaking, regulators 
establish rates after a review and approval of the utility’s total revenue require-
ment measured during a historical ‘test year.’”). 
 207. See, e.g., MARK COOPER, ADVANCED COST RECOVERY FOR NUCLEAR RE-
ACTORS: A BAD IDEA THAT GETS WORSE BY THE MINUTE 3–4 (2011), http://www 
.iaumc.org/files/fileslibrary/2011NuclearPower-CooperIssueBrief.pdf (describ-
ing how capital investments must be “used and useful” and “just, reasonable, 
and prudent” before they can be passed on to customers). 
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of electricity may be $0.05, but the actual “levelized” cost to con-
sumers might be $0.10 per kWh, to incorporate cost recovery for 
the fixed capital investments.208 The depreciation rates for capi-
tal assets will determine how they are built into the base rate, 
and this can be an important policy lever. By accelerating depre-
ciation rates, rate-makers can, in effect, expedite cost recovery, 
and so allow utilities to amortize their investments more 
quickly. 
To be explicit, we propose that state regulators allow natu-
ral gas utilities to recover their investments from consumers 
more quickly in exchange for losing the right to sue for a regula-
tory taking in the future.209 An aggressive form of cost recovery 
is currently being used—controversially, it is true—to stimulate 
investments in nuclear power. No new nuclear power plants 
have been built in this country for over thirty years. The reason 
is as much financial as it is technological. New plants take a long 
time to build, often struggle to meet regulatory requirements, 
and are beset by cost overruns. The problem for a public utility, 
then, is that the substantial costs of developing a nuclear power 
plant are not typically passed on to consumers until the plant 
actually comes online.210 As a result, some utility regulators 
have adopted accelerated cost recovery, allowing the costs of nu-
clear plants to be built into base rate before the plant actually 
starts producing power.211 The effect is to lower the financial 
risks for the utility, to provide access to less expensive financing 
mechanisms, and thereby to incentivize the construction of new 
plants. The strategy is controversial because it increases costs to 
consumers in the short run, and it folds in costs of nuclear facil-
ities that may not actually benefit consumers for decades, if 
ever.212 
 
 208. See, e.g., Electric Generating Costs: A Primer, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. 
(Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/electric 
-generating-costs-a-primer. 
 209. In effect, this addresses the more familiar problem of stranded costs 
from a different temporal perspective, ex ante instead of ex post. See Hammond 
& Rossi, supra note 23, at 652–55 (noting the importance of cost recovery). 
 210. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 207, at 3–4 (explaining the relationship 
between ratemaking and cost recovery). 
 211. See 26 U.S.C. § 168 (2012) (providing for accelerated cost recovery); 
26 C.F.R. 1.168(a)-1 (2017) (providing for modified accelerated cost recovery); 
THE CSIS COMM’N ON NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY IN THE U.S., RESTORING U.S. 
LEADERSHIP IN NUCLEAR ENERGY: A NATIONAL SECURITY IMPERATIVE 37 
(2013) (noting that nuclear power is typically eligible for fifteen-year cost recov-
ery). 
 212. See Sony Ben-Moshe et al., Financing the Nuclear Renaissance: The 
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The accelerated depreciation we propose for natural gas 
avoids some of the pitfalls of accelerated cost recovery for nuclear 
plants by ensuring that natural gas facilities are actually online 
and producing power before being added to base rate. Acceler-
ated depreciation will still force consumers to bear some or, po-
tentially, all of the risk of regulatory change by paying for the 
costs of natural gas infrastructure early. If our predictions are 
correct, they will be buying facilities with shortened lifespans re-
sulting from regulatory, rather than physical, limits. But to the 
extent we are right, this accelerated repayment also reflects re-
ality and provides a more realistic price signal about the true 
cost of power generation. In other words, consumers should pay 
for this risk because it provides a more accurate pricing mecha-
nism for the true cost of natural gas. In effect, it forces consum-
ers to internalize at least some of the intertemporal costs of en-
ergy consumption today. 
This approach might also blunt utilities’ opposition to our 
sunrise proposals and might indeed make them supporters. For 
a utility, the ability to recover capital expenditures on an accel-
erated basis is a substantial economic benefit. More importantly, 
it is a benefit in the short term in exchange for eliminating tak-
ings protection in the long term. While pricing and individual 
risk preferences matter, we expect that this is an exchange 
many, if not most, utilities would willingly undertake. In other 
words, this is a better outcome than the do-nothing path we are 
currently on. Utilities know there is a chance that natural gas 
will be subject to significant new carbon regulations in the future 
and that the Takings Clause may not provide them with com-
pensation. Our proposal for accelerated cost recovery coupled 
with prospective grandfathering gives utilities a meaningful eco-
nomic benefit and it may even increase the competitive ad-
vantage of natural gas over coal. 
Some may object that this proposal amounts to paying off 
the natural gas industry when no payment should be necessary. 
Not only is it normatively problematic to transfer money to an 
industry creating a significant public harm, it also amounts to 
an implicit concession that compensation may be required for the 
 
Benefits and Potential Pitfalls of Federal & State Government Subsidies and the 
Future of Nuclear Power in California, 30 ENERGY L.J. 497, 502 (2009) (noting 
that cost recovery for nuclear power is often structured without regard to budget 
overruns or commercial viability); William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of 
Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA 
L. REV. 810, 849 (2016) (citing disputes over cost recovery for facilities that 
would never be useful). 
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eventual regulation of natural gas and for the regulation of fossil 
fuels more broadly. Both are serious objections. But the acceler-
ated cost recovery we envision should be viewed as an induce-
ment to develop energy infrastructure in the face of a shorter-
than-normal lifespan. It is not compensation for the eventual 
regulation, so much as it is creating incentives for the develop-
ment of natural gas despite its inevitable regulation. What we 
offer is a form of implicit compensation that prevents the even-
tual regulation of natural gas from being a taking in the first 
place. 
We must also acknowledge that nothing in this proposal will 
prevent owners of natural gas infrastructure from suing in the 
future, regardless of the ex ante payoff. They can take the money 
from accelerated depreciation and then sue under the Takings 
Clause when the government eventually regulates. There is, of 
course, no way to prevent someone from suing in the future; 
courts remain accessible for adjudicating constitutional claims. 
Nevertheless, the logic of prospective grandfathering and ex ante 
amortization will make takings claims even more difficult to win 
than they already are. And perhaps even more importantly, our 
proposal should shift the politics of such regulatory takings 
claims. State officials should not fear losing either in courts of 
law or in courts of public opinion when the natural gas industry 
is understood to have benefitted in clear and quantifiable ways 
leading up to the regulation. 
More creative approaches could change those dynamics fur-
ther. For example, instead of allowing utilities to capture the 
benefits of accelerated depreciation immediately, those extra 
funds could, in effect, be escrowed for the life of natural gas, to 
be paid only when natural gas is, in fact, eliminated. Utilities in 
the future would then have a more complicated decision about 
whether to challenge the inevitable regulation. The money set 
aside would amount to a kind of payment in the future if and 
when utilities acquiesced to the new regulatory regime. This 
could be combined with limits on legal challenges, more-or-less 
complicated payout triggers and schedules, and so forth. We are 
confident that many different structures would accomplish our 
overall goals, but we reserve those details for future work. One 
advantage of implementing prospective grandfathering through 
state utility regulators is the opportunity to experiment with a 
number of different approaches. 
Focusing on state regulators to trigger prospective grandfa-
thering has another obvious disadvantage, however. It will allow 
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for prospective grandfathering only in those states that actually 
adopt our proposal, and in which amortization is allowed. Tak-
ings claims will remain as viable as before in states that do not 
allow accelerated depreciation. Nevertheless, this is still an im-
provement over the status quo. And to the extent that the natu-
ral gas infrastructure relies on network effects, anticipating the 
loss of pipelines, wells, and even power plants in some states 
may be enough to alter the reasonable expectations of the indus-
try as a whole. 
Other policy levers could have the same effect as accelerated 
cost recovery through state utility regulators. For instance, the 
IRS could offer accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. This 
would, in effect, allow the natural gas industry to deduct a 
greater portion of its capital costs in its federal tax returns. 
Other approaches could include state or federal tax credits, or 
other forms of more explicit payment. We are agnostic, but we 
suspect that our proposal for intervention by state utility regu-
lators is both the most likely politically, and the most effective. 
We consider the politics of our proposal next. 
C. IN DEFENSE OF PROSPECTIVE GRANDFATHERING 
Stepping back from the details of accelerated cost recovery 
by state regulators, our proposal to sunrise new regulation prom-
ises some important benefits that go beyond just natural gas. For 
one, opposition may be less intense because the expected cost of 
the regulation is relatively small today. By delaying the effect of 
new regulations far into the future, the discounted present value 
of the regulatory burdens will be relatively small. Indeed, that is 
the doctrinal justification for our approach. 
In the context of natural gas, this means specifically that 
industry has less reason to fight the sunrise provision today.213 
Industry will have plenty of opportunity to lobby against any 
eventual regulations in subsequent decades, and so the costs of 
this early authorization are perhaps too abstract to generate in-
tense political opposition. Moreover, the law can be viewed as a 
kind of safety valve or insurance policy in case the dire predic-
tions of global climate change come true. The kind of deferred 
regulatory authorization that a sunrise provision reflects may 
 
 213. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 169, at 570–71 (“[R]ules that require 
delay between when a problem is identified and when legislation may be en-
acted will weaken the relative power of interest groups, and thus increase the 
probability that public-spirited legislation will be enacted.”). 
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actually thread the increasingly thin needle of political feasibil-
ity and meaningful impact. The costs today are modest, but by 
preventing future regulatory takings claims, it preserves greater 
flexibility for regulators in the future faced with the need to elim-
inate natural gas from our energy infrastructure. 
More subtly, pushing implementation far into the future 
may also cause decision-makers today to be more other-regard-
ing. In the context of constitutional changes, Professor Amar ob-
served: “Once Americans understand that . . . they are setting 
up fair procedures not so much for themselves as for their un-
born grandchildren and great-grandchildren, they should be 
more likely to focus on what is truly right rather that what is in 
their own current interest.”214 The same logic applies to our pro-
posal, and so promises a way through some legislative logjams. 
Pushing the implementation date of carbon regulations far 
enough into the future allows for an exclusively future-oriented 
rule. And, of course, if the world turns out differently than cur-
rent policy makers predict, they can always change the rule 
later. 
This last point is important both legally and conceptually. 
One objection to the kind of sunrise rule we propose—especially 
with the long duration necessary for natural gas—is the problem 
of dead hand control. One Congress or agency cannot make pol-
icy binding on future generations.215 Lawmakers must respond 
to the policy preferences of their own constituents and are not 
beholden to the past. A long sunrise provision may appear to be 
an attempt to force contemporary policy preferences on to the 
future. But we are, in fact, arguing for just the opposite. Our fo-
cus is on preserving policy flexibility into the future, by ensuring 
that property rights are not allowed to constrain foreseeable reg-
ulatory initiatives. And of course, there is nothing binding about 
a sunrise rule. Its strength lies in its inertia. If future genera-
tions want to change course, there is nothing to prevent them 
from doing so. If the scientific consensus on climate change turns 
out to be wrong or the balance of costs and benefits shifts in a 
different direction than now seems likely, future policymakers 
will not be prevented from allowing the continued use of natural 
 
 214. AMAR, supra note 24, at 475; see also Herz-Roiphe & Grewal, supra note 
24, at 1980 (arguing that sunrise lawmaking “can be used to enlarge the sphere 
of democratic participation when short-term vested interests might otherwise 
stand in the way”). 
 215. See Serkin, supra note 25, at 881 (“In a democracy, governments are 
not allowed to bind future governments.”). 
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gas plants. But they will have the flexibility to act. 
This observation does not undermine the value of sunrise 
rules because their inertial force may be considerable. Moreover, 
adopting the rule today will—as we argue—defang one of the ob-
jections that future generations might have to adopting a rule 
themselves: that it interferes too much with settled expectations. 
Compared to enacting a ban or significant regulation of carbon 
today, the approach we propose is indeed weak tea. But as com-
pared to doing nothing today, our proposal may meaningfully 
change both the political and legal landscape decades from now 
when the nation will need to wean itself off of natural gas. 
  CONCLUSION   
Natural gas poses a particular challenge to policymakers to-
day. Rapid and widespread proliferation of natural gas is essen-
tial if we are to make major progress in reducing carbon emis-
sions. However, we will eventually have to wean ourselves off of 
natural gas, too, and so we can anticipate strict new emissions 
rules applying to natural gas several decades from now. When 
that happens, investors and owners of the natural gas infra-
structure are almost certain to object and claim that the inevita-
ble regulations are unconstitutional takings of their property. 
Fortunately, there are tools available to us today that will help 
to defang those takings claims in both public debates and legal 
actions. For one, developing a clear and widely disseminated rec-
ord detailing the likely future constraints on natural-gas-fired 
power plants will help to limit reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations of the natural gas industry. More provocatively, too, 
adopting rules with long sunrise periods should count as a kind 
of prospective grandfathering that allows the natural gas indus-
try to amortize its investments. This, in turn, will forestall tak-
ings claims, allowing even regulations that eliminate existing 
uses of property without explicit monetary compensation. 
Prospective grandfathering through sunrise rulemaking 
may prove useful beyond the context of natural gas. It is a par-
ticularly powerful tool for easing transition costs, and may cut 
through some of the political opposition that faster changes often 
generate. In a world with seemingly hopeless legislative grid-
lock, deploying these kinds of creative timing rules may provide 
some modest opportunity to pursue meaningful changes in the 
law. 
